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AbSTRAcT
The finances of many states, cities, and other localities are in dire straits.  In this Article, 
we argue that partial responsibility for this situation lies with the outdated and ineffective 
financial reporting regime for public entities.  Ineffective reporting has obscured and 
continues to obscure the extent of municipal financial problems, thus delaying or even 
preventing corrective actions.  Worse, ineffective reporting has created incentives for 
accounting gimmicks that have directly contributed to the dramatic decline of public 
sector finances.  Fixing the reporting regime is thus a necessary first step toward fiscal 
recovery.  We provide concrete examples of advisable changes in accounting rules and 
advocate for institutional changes, particularly Securities and Exchange Commission 
involvement, that we hope will lead to better public accounting rules generally.
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INTRODUCTION  
Detroit’s recent bankruptcy filing highlighted what savvy observers have 
been warning about for years: The finances of many states, cities, and other 
localities, collectively referred to as municipalities and municipal finances, are 
in dire straits.1  Total state debt, not even counting local debt, is now in excess 
of $5 trillion, which equates to roughly $16,000 per capita.2  The situation is 
even more dismal when corrections are made for faulty reporting.  For 
example, the City of Detroit revealed roughly $3.5 billion in previously 
undisclosed liabilities after reevaluating its pension obligations as part of its 
bankruptcy petition.3  Besides Detroit, many other cities, states, and territories, 
such as Puerto Rico, are widely believed to be close to defaulting on their debt.4   
In this Article, we argue that this financial calamity is attributable in part 
to the outdated and ineffective financial reporting regime for public entities 
and that fixing this regime is a necessary first step toward fiscal recovery.  
Ineffective reporting has obscured and continues to obscure the extent of the 
problem, thus delaying or even preventing corrective actions.  Worse, ineffective 
reporting has created incentives for accounting gimmicks that have directly 
contributed to the dramatic decline of public sector finances.  We provide 
concrete examples of advisable changes in accounting rules and advocate for 
institutional changes, particularly Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) involvement that we hope will lead to better public accounting rules 
generally. 
The current reporting regime is misleading and dangerous because of 
features that are not required by any particularity of public sector finances.  
The regime is misleading because it omits foreseeable long-term consequences 
from reported financial numbers.  And it is dangerous because the omission 
of consequences blinds citizens and perhaps even politicians to the long-term 
 
1. See, e.g., Jeffrey Miron, The Fiscal Health of U.S. States 11–25 (Mercatus Ctr., Working Paper 
No. 11-33, 2011). 
2. Cory Eucalitto, State Budget Solutions’ Fourth Annual State Debt Report, STATE BUDGET 
SOLUTIONS (Jan. 8, 2014), http://www.statebudgetsolutions.org/publications/detail/state-
budget-solutions-fourth-annual-state-debt-report. 
3. See Mary Williams Walsh, Detroit Gap Reveals Industry Dispute on Pension Math, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 19, 2013, 9:01 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/07/19/detroit-gap-
reveals-industry-dispute-on-pension-math. 
4. See Melvin Backman, Is Puerto Rico Going to Default?, CNN MONEY (July 2, 2014, 3:58 
PM), http://money.cnn.com/2014/07/02/investing/puerto-rico-downgrade. 
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repercussions of politicians’ choices.5  At worst, it may prompt politicians to 
choose economically suboptimal measures precisely because it allows them 
to misrepresent their financial performance to voters. 
The reporting regime we discuss about is separate from the budget.  The 
budget is a plan of cash outlays and receipts, generally for one year.  State 
constitutions and legislation require a budget and regulate its content and 
adoption.6  In most cases, the budget requires a proposal by the executive and 
approval by the legislature.7  This budget process tends to attract considerable 
attention by politicians and the press.8  As it is only concerned with cash, 
however, the budget is quite uninformative about long-term fiscal health.9  
Assessment of long-term fiscal health requires information about other 
components of state wealth, in particular obligations and other non-cash 
assets.  Such information appears in the financial reports that are the subject 
of this Article. 
A simple observation about state finances and budget rules illustrates the 
preceding point.  Almost all states require a balanced budget.10  That is, they 
require that the projected inflows are at least equal to the projected outflows.11  
To the extent actual inflows and outflows diverge, many states impose 
constraints to rebalance the two.12  And yet, states have amassed massive 
financial shortfalls over time.13  This was possible because the budget and 
hence the balanced budget requirement only relates to cash movements in the 
 
5. In this paper, we take it for granted that improving disclosure would be beneficial.  While 
there are contexts in which improving disclosure can be counterproductive (for example, 
diplomatic negotiations; see also Jacob E. Gersen & Matthew C. Stephenson, Over-
Accountability, 6 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS (forthcoming 2014) (describing situations in which 
political accountability produces negative results)), there are no reasons to believe the present 
context is one of them.  No commentator has claimed that withholding information about 
public finances from voters and politicians would be beneficial.  And as we discuss below, 
there is empirical evidence that missing disclosure leads to negative consequences. 
6. See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, NCSL FISCAL BRIEF: STATE 
BALANCED BUDGET PROVISIONS 2–6 (Oct. 2010) [hereinafter NCSL], available at 
http://www.ncsl.org/documents/fiscal/StateBalancedBudgetProvisions2010.pdf.  
7. Id. at 3. 
8.  For example, a search on wsj.com revealed that there were 8 articles in the Wall Street 
Journal during 2014 concerning California’s State Budget. See, e.g., Alejandro Lazo, 
California Budget Increases Spending as State Enjoys a Surplus, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 9, 2014, 2:46 
PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303393804579310603091572462.   
9. A separate issue is that the budget as such is only a projection.  Actual inflows and outflows 
may differ.  See Thomas A. Garrett, State Balanced-Budget and Debt Rules, 33 ECON. 
SYNOPSES (2011). 
10. See NCSL, supra note 6, at 1–13. 
11.  See id. 
12. See id. 
13.  See Miron, supra note 1, at 11–25; Eucalitto, supra note 2. 
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states’ so-called general fund.  This has allowed states to “balance their budgets” 
by, for example, reducing the contribution to their state pension fund.14  The 
consequence is that, inter alia, the gap between state pension obligations and 
state pension assets has grown.15  It is as if one were to balance the inflows 
and outflows in a checking account by drawing on a credit card.  The checking 
account would not reveal any trouble even while large debts amassed on the 
credit card. 
The tool to capture the economic situation comprehensively is the 
consolidated financial report.  It combines positions of all subdivisions, netting 
out internal movements that are a wash from the perspective of the entity as a 
whole.16  The consolidated financial report is not limited to cash; it includes 
assets and obligations of all types.17  The requisite valuation of long-term assets 
and obligations is not straightforward.  Benefitting from centuries of 
experience, modern accounting employs the so-called accrual system to deal 
with long-term assets and obligations.  The accrual system requires reporting 
at the time of the transaction or when the obligation is promised, even if no 
cash is exchanged.18  The details are contained in extensive rules and 
principles, such as the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) 
promulgated by the U.S. Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) or 
the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) promulgated by the 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB).19  Preparation of financial 
reports in accordance with such rules is standard for private sector firms 
around the world and is mandatory for the vast majority of large firms.20 
Most U.S. states and local entities prepare financial reports in 
accordance with a separate set of GAAP developed by the Governmental 
Accounting Standards Board (GASB).21  Superficially, public sector GAAP 
resembles its private sector counterpart.  Like FASB, GASB is organized by 
the private Financial Accounting Foundation with the purpose of crafting 
principles to “[a]ssess the finances of the government in its entirety” using a 
 
14. NCSL, supra note 6, at 8. 
15. James Naughton et al., Economic Consequences of Public Pension Accounting Rules (Sept. 
5, 2014) (unpublished working paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2199067. 
16. WARREN RUPPEL, GAAP FOR GOVERNMENTS 2014, at 158 (2014). 
17. Id. 
18. LAWRENCE REVSINE ET AL., FINANCIAL REPORTING & ANALYSIS 57 (5th ed. 2012). 
19. Id. at 17–21. 
20. Id. 
21. The Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) has responsibility for setting 
standards for state and local governments and governmental not-for-profit organizations. 
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modified accrual system.22  Beneath the surface, however, GASB deviates 
considerably from FASB.23  We argue that many of these deviations are 
misguided and have disastrous consequences for public sector finances. 
Under current GASB GAAP, the budgeting process and financial 
reports for public entities are often described as unintelligible.24  One reason 
for this is that the current regime does not provide the information necessary 
to understand why the cash-based performance reported on the budget differs 
from the accrual-based performance on the financial statements (a so-called 
“reconciliation”).25  Another reason is that the accrual measures themselves 
are incomplete, as GASB deviates in some important respects from true 
accrual accounting.26  Below, we discuss examples that illustrate these 
shortcomings in concrete settings. 
Crucially, there is now strong empirical evidence that the reporting 
failures not only conceal, but partially cause, fiscal problems.27  Much of this 
 
22. Summary of Statement No. 34, GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., 
http://www.gasb.org/st/summary/gstsm34.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2014). 
23. See infra Part II.A. 
24. In the annual report filed immediately prior to Jefferson County’s bankruptcy, which at that 
time was the largest in the United States, there was no indication in its financial statements 
that there was anything wrong.  Consider the following: “‘What do I do with a CAFR 
[comprehensive annual financial report]?’ asks Cameron Smith, who, as policy director for 
the Alabama Policy Institute, has spent a considerable amount of time sifting through the 
wreckage of the Jefferson County crash.  Even if there was truly damning information 
contained in a CAFR, it would be hard to find, says Smith.  He sees CAFRs as a potentially 
insidious exercise in ‘flood[ing] the market with data that no one knows what to do with.’”  
Jonathan Walters, Are the Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports Useless?, GOVERNING.COM 
(Sept. 2012), http://www.governing.com/topics/finance/gov-are-annual-financial-reports-
useless.html. 
25. This is so in spite of GASB Concept Statement No. 1, which states: “Financial reports are 
used primarily to compare actual financial results with the legally adopted budget; to assess 
financial condition and results of operations; to assist in determining compliance with 
finance-related laws, rules, and regulations; and to assist in evaluating efficiency and 
effectiveness.”  GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., No. 037, CONCEPTS 
STATEMENT NO. 1 OF THE GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD: 
OBJECTIVES OF FINANCIAL REPORTING, at i (1987). 
26. See infra Part II.A.2.  GASB Statement No. 34 was the first to accept the idea of accrual 
accounting.  GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., No. 171-A, STATEMENT 
NO. 34 OF THE GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD: BASIC FINANCIAL 
STATEMENTS—AND MANAGEMENT’S DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS—FOR STATE AND 
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS (1999). 
27. There is long tradition of research showing the relevance of accounting policies for real 
decisionmaking in the private sector.  For example, when companies were required to report 
the cost of postretirement medical costs or stock options on the company’s financial 
statements, the use of these employee benefits dropped dramatically even though the 
economics were unchanged.  This point is discussed in detail in Part II.B.  
  Most importantly, having information reported in earnings has often been found to 
generate a market response even when the information in earnings was previously available.  
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evidence relates to municipal pension obligations, which are notoriously 
understated.28  As we explain below, an aberration in the GASB rules allows 
states to hide some of their pension obligations by choosing a risky 
investment policy for pension assets.29  Naughton et al. show that states that 
understate employee benefit costs end up “overinvesting” in labor, which 
exacerbates fiscal weakness.30  Similarly, Andonov et al. find that states take 
on additional investment risk relative to private and non-U.S. public entities 
not subject to GASB reporting.31  This means that improving government 
accounting will not only clarify states’ existing financial problems but also 
help improve decision making.  These changes will limit the likelihood of 
similar fiscal problems in the future.32 
In most of our discussion, we will refer to FASB rules as examples of 
rules superior to GASB rules.33  Since better rules are readily available, it is 
unclear why GASB has not adopted them.  In a recent white paper, GASB 
 
For example, in a study of debt-equity swaps, Hand (1990) found that there was a market 
reaction to the difference in earnings that was attributable to the debt-equity swap even 
though the debt-equity swap was announced several months prior to earnings.  A debt-equity 
swap occurs when a firm issues equity and retires debt.  Doing so affects earnings because 
there is no longer an interest expense associated with the debt.  See John R. M. Hand, A Test 
of the Extended Functional Fixation Hypothesis, 65 ACCT. REV. 740 (1990).   
28. For more information on the public pension understatement, see Robert Novy-Marx & Josh Rauh, 
Public Pension Promises: How Big Are They and What Are They Worth?, 66 J. FIN. 1211 (2011); Marcia 
Van Wagner & John Lombardi, Adjusted Pension Liability Medians for US States, MOODY’S 
INVESTORS SERV. 1 (June 27, 2013), http://www.ncsl.org/documents/summit/summit2013/ 
online-resources/Moody-Adjusted-Pension-Liability-Medians.pdf. 
29. See infra Part II.B.3. 
30. The economic magnitude of this effect is dramatic.  Naughton et al. document that the 
average state spends an extra $125 million on hiring future employees due to the deviations of 
the GASB methodology from Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) measures of 
cost.  Naughton et al., supra note 15, at 30.  We place “overinvestment” in quotation marks 
because we generally remain agnostic as to whether the right response to an improved 
understanding of fiscal gaps would be to reduce spending or to raise taxes.  That being said, 
the overall level of spending and taxing is not the only margin on which improper accounting 
may operate.  Underrepresenting the cost of one input (say, state employees) will likely 
increase its use relative to another input whose cost is fully represented (say, purchases of goods). 
31. Aleksandar Andonov et al., Pension Fund Asset Allocation and Liability Discount Rates 29–
30 (Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc., Working Paper, 2014), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2070054. 
32. We focus on the ultimate outcome and remain agnostic about the causal mechanism.  Are 
politicians trying to fool voters or are the politicians themselves confused by bad numbers?  
We bracket this question because our proposal of improved accounting under Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) guidance would seem to be an appropriate remedy under 
either interpretation. 
33. We refer to FASB principles only as an example of a developed accrual accounting and 
disclosure system, and to illustrate the shortcomings of GASB.  We do not mean to imply 
that FASB could be directly applied to governmental activities. 
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argued that its rules are required by particularities of the public sector.34  As 
we discuss in detail, however, these arguments do not withstand scrutiny. 
Given GASB’s reticence in spite of evidence of mounting problems, we 
are skeptical that GASB will reform by itself.  In fact, GASB is presently 
moving in the wrong direction, away from accruals toward more cash-based 
measures.35  Some have speculated that this is due to incompetence or capture 
by the regulated public entities from where GASB’s members hail.36  We 
consider the problem too pressing to wait for the resolution of such debates.  
We point out that one important legal difference between GASB and FASB 
is that the former is not subject to SEC oversight like the latter.37  This may 
explain the differences in substantive rules and suggests that the SEC could 
serve as a natural, qualified regulator to fix the current problem. 
In fact, the only reason why the SEC has not been involved in public 
sector accounting is that the SEC interprets certain exemptions in the 
securities laws as a bar to such involvement.38  Substantively, public sector 
accounting is squarely within the ambit of SEC expertise and responsibility in 
as far as the SEC is responsible for investor protection in the municipal bond 
market, which most public entities use for their financing.39  Such protection 
 
34. GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., WHY GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING 
AND FINANCIAL REPORTING IS—AND SHOULD BE—DIFFERENT 1 (revised Apr. 2013), 
available at http://gasb.org/cs/ContentServer?c=Document_C&pagename=GASB%2FDocument_ 
C%2FGASBDocumentPage&cid=1176162354189. 
35. Compare GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., No. 3-20, PRELIMINARY 
VIEWS ON CONCEPTS RELATED TO RECOGNITION OF ELEMENTS OF FINANCIAL 
STATEMENTS AND MEASUREMENT APPROACHES, at viii (2011) (“This document proposes a 
recognition framework for both the economic resources measurement focus and the near-term 
financial resources measurement focus.”), with id. at 23 (“These minority members believe 
that the near-term measurement focus as proposed would further undermine the objective of 
providing information to assess inter-period equity . . . .”). 
36. Consider the following quote from Arthur Levitt, Chairman of the United States Securities 
and Exchange Commission from 1993 to 2001:  
While the Sarbanes-Oxley Act created an independent funding mechanism for 
the FASB, the GASB, in order to operate, still relies on donations from those 
for whom they write standards . . . . Congress should also create an 
independent source of funding for the GASB, as it has for the FASB.  The 
potential for crisis in municipal finance arguably is worse than that in corporate 
America; the public sector needs an equally independent and strong standard-setter.   
Arthur Levitt, Jr., Opinion, Standards Deviation, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 9, 2007, 12:01 AM), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB117341014938031922. 
37. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT ON THE MUNICIPAL SECURITIES MARKET (2012), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2012/munireport073112.pdf. 
38. Id. 
39. See The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilitates 
Capital Formation, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml# 
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is all the more important now that the municipal bond market has become 
riskier as a result of deteriorating public finances and the disappearance of 
monocline insurers, who used to insure investors against municipal default.40  
We therefore support the SEC’s recent request to Congress for authority to 
regulate financial reporting of municipal bond issuers.41 
In contrast to the SEC, this Article explicitly cautions that merely 
mandating compliance with existing GASB will not be sufficient.  The 
GASB rules themselves must be improved to ameliorate the problems caused 
by insufficient financial reporting of public finances.  Part I reviews the idea 
and practical relevance of consolidated financial reporting using accrual 
accounting.  Part II highlights the shortcomings of the current GASB regime.  It 
discusses several concrete examples of how GASB has tolerated and even 
caused unsound financial choices on behalf of the states.  Part III refutes 
GASB’s stated reasons for these deviations.  GASB’s reticence to enact 
reform leads Part IV to suggest that the SEC should be provided with 
additional rulemaking power to enact the necessary reforms. 
I. FUNDAMENTALS OF FINANCIAL REPORTING 
This section outlines in greater detail how financial reporting works and 
what research has shown that it accomplishes from an economic standpoint.  
First, we introduce the core concept of accrual accounting.  We illustrate 
accrual accounting’s superiority to cash accounting at tracking long-term 
economic performance.  Second, we explain that the most effective accrual 
accounting regime42 generates financial statements that not only report 
 
.VG86oVXUuPg (last visited Nov. 21, 2014); U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 37, 
at 71.  
40. For a summary of the decline of monocline insurance, see Todd L. Ely, No Guaranties: The Decline 
of Municipal Bond Insurance, 32 PUB. BUDGETING & FIN. 105, 105–07 (2012).  On state’s 
use of the bond market to cover budget shortfalls, see Scott Pattison & Michael Streepy, Municipal 
Bonds In 2011: An Update on State and Local Borrowing, NASBO (Nov. 23, 2011), 
http://www.nasbo.org/sites/default/files/Municipal%20Bonds%20-%20An%20Update%20 
on%20State%20and%20Local%20Borrowing_0.pdf. 
41. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 37, at viii (requesting that Congress “[a]uthorize the 
Commission to establish the form and content of financial statements for municipal issuers 
who issue municipal securities, including the authority to recognize the standards of a 
designated private-sector body as generally accepted for purposes of the federal securities 
laws, and provide the Commission with attendant authority over such private-sector body”).  
The SEC report was preceded by GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-267R, 
DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM ACT: ROLE OF GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING 
STANDARDS BOARD IN THE MUNICIPAL SECURITIES MARKETS AND ITS PAST 
FUNDING (2011), which was in turn mandated by section 976 of the Dodd-Frank Act.   
42. Such as that employed by FASB for private entities. 
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financial information based on accruals but also reconciles that information to 
cash-basis accounting.  Third, we review empirical evidence emphasizing the 
importance of effective reporting for spending.  This evidence shows that an 
effective accounting regime provides transparency into past spending and 
provides the foundation to set policies that determine future spending.  
Finally, we conclude with some observations about realistic expectations of 
any financial reporting regime.  We acknowledge that accrual accounting is 
not perfect and that financial economists often make ad hoc adjustments 
for aspects of accrual accounting when trying to understand the economic 
value of a reporting entity.43  But many of these adjustments arise due to 
economic activities that are specific to the private sector.44  Moreover, 
attempts to modify general accounting rules in this direction have been 
unsuccessful.45 
A. Accrual Accounting 
1. Illustration of Cash Versus Accrual Accounting 
The mechanics of accrual accounting are best illustrated through an 
example contrasting it with cash accounting.  Consider a magazine publisher 
that sells a three-year subscription to a customer who pays the full three-year 
price of $300 upfront.  Further, assume that the costs of production and 
distribution are $60 per customer per year, and that those costs are paid in 
cash each year.  Under a cash-based approach, the publisher would record 
cash inflows of $300 in the first year, and cash outflows of $60 each year for 
three years.  The publisher would have cash-basis income of $240 in the first 
year, and a cash-basis loss—also known as a net outflow—of $60 in each of 
the next two years.  This is illustrated below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
43. In particular, such examples explain why new economy firms, such as Twitter or Facebook, 
can raise billions in their initial public offerings even though their accounting statements 
misleadingly imply that the firms are essentially worthless.  See IVO WELCH, CORPORATE 
FINANCE 182–85 (3d ed. 2014). 
44. For example, research and development activity, which is discussed infra Part I.D. 
45. For example, the Economic Value Added (EVA) approach, which is discussed infra Part I.D. 
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TABLE 1.  Cash-Basis Income Determination 
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Total 
Cash inflows $300 $0 $0 $300 
Cash outflows for production and distribution (60) (60) (60) (180) 
Net income (loss)—cash basis 240 (60) (60) 120 
 
The cash-basis income reflects the flow of cash—similar to looking at a 
personal bank account.  In contrast, and as we will show in this section, 
accrual accounting does not follow the flow of cash.  Accrual accounting has 
in fact become the dominant form of accounting in large part because it 
overcomes the inherent mismatch between economic benefits and costs that 
arise due to timing differences in cash flows.46  In the above example, the 
inflows of $300 in the first year do not match with the outflows of $60 in the 
current year as well as the following two years.  The magazine that is 
produced and distributed in the first year at an economic cost of $60 did not 
produce an economic benefit of $300.  To wit, an observer who had access to 
the cash accounting numbers only for Year 1 might be misled into thinking 
that the company has made an economic profit of $240 in Year 1, rather than 
the $40 it actually made.  More to the point, the focus on cash inflows and 
outflows in any given year with no attention paid to other changes in the 
business paints an incomplete and hence a potentially grossly distorted 
picture of the underlying economic situation.47  
By contrast, accrual accounting matches economic benefits—the subscription 
revenue—with economic costs—the price of magazine production and 
distribution.48  As a result, it produces a measure of operating performance 
that provides a clearer picture of the success or failure of past economic 
transactions.  This is illustrated below. 
 
 
 
 
 
46. REVSINE ET AL., supra note 18, at 57. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. 
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TABLE 2.  Accrual-Basis Income Determination 
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Total 
Revenue 100 100 100 300 
Expenses for production and distribution (60) (60) (60) (180) 
Net income (loss)—accrual basis 40 40 40 120 
 
Accrual accounting shows revenue of $100 each period, even though the 
$300 is received in full at the start of the first period.  This is because accrual 
accounting recognizes revenue when it is both earned and realizable.49  
Earned implies that the company has performed its obligations, which in this 
case means producing and shipping the magazine to the customer.50  
Realizable requires that the company reasonably expects payment.51  In the 
above example, since the customer has paid the full three-year subscription 
upfront, the only contingency is whether the revenue is earned.  Therefore, it 
is upon the shipment of each year’s magazine that revenue is recognized.52 
The annual expense of $60 is recorded each year when the associated 
revenue is recognized and hence the expense is incurred, rather than when the 
expense is paid.  Again, the primary advantage of accrual accounting is that it 
matches economic benefits with the corresponding economic costs.  The 
recognition of expense is recorded using what is called the matching 
principle.53  The matching principle requires that when a particular expense 
can be matched to a particular stream of revenue, both the expense and 
revenue be recognized at the same time.54  In the above example, since $100 
 
49. Id. 
50. Id. 
51. For example, if goods were shipped to a customer who was bankrupt and not expected to pay 
for the goods, the company would not be permitted to recognize the revenue associated with 
this transaction. 
52. Under accrual accounting, the fact that the publisher was paid in advance creates a liability for 
Deferred Revenue equal to $200.  This liability is reduced in later periods when the magazine 
is actually provided to the customer and the revenue is recognized. 
53. REVSINE ET AL., supra note 18, at 57. 
54. If an expense cannot be matched to revenue, then it is recognized when it is incurred.  This 
does not imply that payment has been made.  Rather, it only implies that an obligation to pay 
has arisen.  For example, the salary for a company’s CEO is recorded in the period during 
which he has earned his salary.  If the CEO’s salary is $100,000 for a twelve-month period, 
then the salary expense for the year is $100,000.  It could be the case that the CEO has not 
been paid the full $100,000 due to payroll periods that end on different dates than the 
company’s fiscal year.  Any difference between what is paid and what was incurred gives raise 
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of revenue is recognized each period, the associated costs of distribution and 
production of $60 are recognized each period.  As was the case with revenue, 
the flow of cash is not part of the expense recognition criteria.55 
The application of accrual accounting does not change the aggregate 
long-term financial statement impact of a specific transaction.  Eventually, 
expenses and revenues will appear in accounting statements under both a cash 
and accrual basis.56  In the above example, the publisher has an accumulated 
net income of $120 under both approaches at the end of three years.  Rather, 
an accrual system changes when aspects of a particular economic transaction 
are reflected in the financial statements, and it does so in a way that provides 
critical information.57  Accrual accounting matches economic benefits with 
economic costs, thus providing a clearer picture of the economic benefit to 
the publisher of selling subscriptions.58 
2. Cash Flow Projections Are Inferior to Accrual Accounting 
Despite the fact that accrual accounting only changes when aspects of a 
particular transaction are recorded in financial statements, the benefits of 
accrual accounting are not supplanted by cash flow projections.  In the above 
example, the underlying economics would have been clear if a three-year cash 
flow projection were made available.  If the company had only one transaction, 
then a cash flow projection at the time that transaction is undertaken is just 
as informative as accrual accounting.  But once numerous transactions are 
aggregated, cash flow projections can provide a very misleading picture of 
company performance. 
Consider again a company that is always paid $300 for a three-year 
subscription.  But contrary to the earlier example, assume that the costs of 
production and distribution are now $150 per customer per year rather than 
 
to either a prepaid item (if more than $100,000 was paid) or an accrued item (if less than 
$100,000 was paid). 
55. Suppose that the expenses for production and distribution were paid upfront by the publisher.  
In this case, the recorded expense would still be $60 each period and the reported income 
would be unchanged.  The additional amounts paid in cash in the first year would be 
recorded as a Prepaid Expense, which is an asset.  Similarly, if the expenses for production 
and distribution were paid at the end of the three-year period, the reported income would 
again be unchanged.  The company would still record an expense of $60 each period, and to 
the extent that it hasn’t paid those expenses, it would also record an Accrued Expense, which 
is a liability.  The existence of prepaid and accrued items is what gives rise to the name 
“accrual accounting.” 
56. REVSINE ET AL., supra note 18, at 60. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. 
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$60.  This means that every subscription sold generates an economic loss of 
$50 per year (or $150 over three years), as the revenue of $100 is less than the 
costs of $150.  As a result, the accrual-basis loss will be $50 each year.  Since 
three years of subscription revenue are received in the first year, there will be 
cash-basis income of $150 in the first year and a cash-basis loss of $150 in the 
second and third years.59 
Even though this company is undertaking an activity that generates a 
loss, it could remain “profitable” on a cash-basis for several periods if it 
continued to attract new customers.  For example, consider the case in 
which the company sells to ten customers the first year, twenty-five 
customers the second year, and sixty customers the third year.  In the first 
year, the cash inflow is $3000 and the cash outflow is $1500, resulting in 
positive cash flow of $1500.60  In the second year, the cash inflow is $7500 
and the cash outflow is $5250, resulting in positive cash flow of $2250.61  
In the third year, the cash inflow is $18,000 and the cash outflow is 
$14,250, resulting in positive cash flow of $3750.62  The cash-basis income 
is summarized below: 
 
 
 
 
59. The total cash inflow in the first year is $300 and the total cash outflow is $150, resulting 
in a net inflow of $150 in the first year.  In the second and third years, there is no cash 
inflow but there is a cash outflow of $150, resulting in a net outflow of $150 in each of 
these years. 
60. The cash inflow of $3000 is calculated by multiplying the subscription revenue per customer 
of $300 by the number of new customers.  There are ten new customers in the first year.  The 
cash outflow of $1500 is calculated by multiplying the cost of production and distribution per 
customer of $150 by the total number of current customers.  In the first year, there are a total 
of ten customers. 
61. The cash inflow of $7500 is calculated by multiplying the subscription revenue per customer 
of $300 by the number of new customers.  There are twenty-five new customers in the second 
year.  The cash outflow of $5250 is calculated by multiplying the cost of production and 
distribution per customer of $150 by the total number of current customers.  In the second 
year, there are a total of thirty-five customers, ten who subscribed in Year 1 and twenty-five 
who subscribed in Year 2. 
62. The cash inflow of $18,000 is calculated by multiplying the subscription revenue per 
customer of $300 by the number of new customers.  There are sixty new customers in the 
third year.  The cash outflow of $14,250 is calculated by multiplying the cost of production 
and distribution per customer of $150 by the total number of current customers.  In the third 
year, there are a total of ninety-five customers, ten who subscribed in Year 1, twenty-five who 
subscribed in Year 2 and sixty who subscribed in Year 3. 
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TABLE 3.  Cash-Basis Income Determination: Growing Company With 
Unprofitable Product 
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Total 
Cash inflows 3000 7500 18,000 28,500 
Cash outflows for production and 
distribution 1500 5250 14,250 21,000 
Net income (loss)—cash basis 1500 2250 3750 7500 
 
The cash basis performance of the company is in stark contrast to the 
actual economic performance, which is a loss of $50 per customer per year.63  
The accrual-basis income is summarized below: 
 
TABLE 4.  Accrual-Basis Income Determination: Growing Company With 
Unprofitable Product 
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Total 
Revenue 1000 3500 9500 14,000 
Expenses for production and distribution 1500 5250 14,250 21,000 
Net income (loss)—accrual basis (500) (1750) (4750) (7000) 
 
A comparison of the cash- and accrual-based performances provided 
above illustrates the problem of relying on cash-based accounting.  The 
company in this example is not only profitable on a cash-basis in the first year, 
but it is increasingly profitable in each successive year.  Conversely, when 
accruals are used the company is increasingly unprofitable.  This illustration is 
consistent with economic reality since the company is selling a product that 
costs $450 for only $300 and is selling more of that product in later years.  
The difference between the two approaches arises because the receipt of cash for 
subscriptions is different from when the revenue associated with subscriptions is 
recognized.64  The difference between accrual-based performance and cash-based 
 
63. Fifty dollars is the difference between the revenue per customer per year of $100, which is 
one-third of the three-year subscription cost, and the $150 annual cost of production and 
distribution. 
64. The cash-outflow and the expense for production and distribution are the same because those 
costs are incurred each period (due to the matching principle) and also paid each period. 
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performance is most significant for long term projects. In long term projects, 
the receipt of cash and the recognition of revenue can be far apart in time, and 
likewise for the payment of cash and the recording of an expense.  As we 
discuss later, this is often true of public sector projects.65 
B. Reconciliation of Accruals and Cash Measures 
While utilizing accruals are crucial, understanding the relationship 
between accruals and cash is generally considered one of the most critical 
inputs into performance evaluation.  For this reason, the FASB,66 the entity 
responsible for private sector standards, mandates the production of three 
distinct statements: the Income Statement, Balance Sheet, and Cash Flow 
Statement.67  The Income Statement measures the “flows” over the course of 
the fiscal year.68  Inflows are revenues and outflows are expenses.69  Net 
Income is calculated by subtracting expenses from revenue.70  The Balance 
Sheet provides a summary of the assets and liabilities of the company as of the 
last day of the fiscal year.71  The Cash Flow Statement measures the “flows” of 
cash over the course of the fiscal year.72   
It may at first seem surprising that an accrual accounting regime would 
provide a Cash Flow Statement.  The Cash Flow Statement, however, is not 
simply a cash-basis equivalent to the income statement.  Rather, it is designed 
to reconcile accrual accounting performance to the change in cash holdings 
 
65. The conclusion that accrual-based accounting is superior to cash-based accounting for 
calculating the economic value of a company extends beyond the example we have 
introduced.  There is a significant body of research that compares valuation models that use 
accruals versus cash flows to estimate company value.  This research generally finds that accruals 
outperform cash flows.  See, e.g., Young K. Kwon, Accrual Versus Cash-Basis Accounting 
Methods: An Agency-Theoretic Comparison, 8 J. ACCT. & PUB. POL’Y 267 (1990); Stefan 
Reichelstein.  Providing Managerial Incentives: Cash Flows Versus Accrual Accounting, 38.2 J. 
ACCT. RES. 243 (2000); Stephen H. Penman & Theodore Sougiannis, A Comparison of 
Dividend, Cash Flow, and Earnings Approaches to Equity Valuation, 15 CONTEMP. ACCT. 
RES. 343 (1998). 
66. The FASB has responsibility for setting accounting and financial reporting standards for 
business enterprises and nongovernmental not-for-profit organizations. 
67. FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., ACCOUNTING STANDARDS UPDATE NO. 2013-07, 
PRESENTATION OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS (TOPIC 205): LIQUIDATION BASIS OF 
ACCOUNTING (2013). 
68. REVSINE ET AL., supra note 18, at 69–74. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. 
71. An asset is a resource under the control of the company that has measureable future economic 
benefits.  Conversely, a liability is a claim that has arisen from a past transaction.  The difference 
between total assets and total liabilities is referred to as shareholders’ equity. 
72. REVSINE ET AL., supra note 18, at 208–10. 
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over an accounting period.73  In other words, the Cash Flow Statement begins 
with Net Income, which is determined using accrual-basis accounting, and 
then makes adjustments for changes in the assets or liabilities of the company 
to arrive at the increase or decrease in cash over the period.74  This allows a 
financial statement user to easily identify whether the firm is generating 
positive cash flow from its operations and whether this performance is 
sustainable. 
Consider again the example of a publisher who sells a three-year 
subscription with upfront cash payment of $300 and annual costs of $60.  To 
produce the Cash Flow Statement, we need to identify changes in either 
assets or liabilities and then adjust Net Income by those changes.  In this 
example, the three-year advance payment creates two balance sheet items: an 
asset of $300 representing the cash held in the publisher’s bank account, and a 
liability representing the future obligation to produce and distribute the 
magazine.  The Cash Flow Statement uses changes in non-cash items to get 
to the ending balance, which reflects the overall change in cash items.  
Therefore, the only adjustment to Net Income relates to the liability of $300 
reflecting the publisher’s obligation to produce and distribute the magazine.  
This liability, which is referred to as Deferred Revenue,75 is reduced over time 
as the publisher produces and distributes the magazine, thereby recognizing 
revenue. 
Therefore, at the exact time that the advance payment is received, there 
is a liability of $300.  This amount is then reduced by $100 each time a 
magazine is distributed to the customer.  For example, since $100 of revenue 
is recognized in the first year, the remaining $200 that was received in cash 
but not recognized as revenue is recorded as Deferred Revenue at the end of 
the first year.  Similarly, in the second year when an additional $100 of 
revenue is recognized, the balance of the Deferred Revenue account is 
reduced from $200 down to $100.  Therefore, Year 1’s Net Income of $40 is 
aggregated with changes in liabilities and assets, which is a $200 increase in 
liabilities,76 to reach Net Cash Flow of $240.  The Cash Flow Statement 
arrives at the same number found in our original Cash-Basis Income 
Determination, where there were cash inflows of $300 and cash outflows of 
$60 for Year 1.  The required Cash Flow Statement for the magazine 
publisher under FASB would be as follows: 
 
73. Id. at 209. 
74. Id. at 1029. 
75. Id. at 59–60. 
76. The initial $300 liability reduced by $100 for the first magazine in Year 1. 
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TABLE 5.  Cash Flow Reconciliation 
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Total 
Net income (loss) 40 40 40 120 
Change in Deferred Revenue 200 (100) (100) 0 
Net Cash Flow 240 (60) (60) 120 
 
C. Economic Consequences of Financial Reporting for Private Firms  
and Entities  
An important assumption underlying our analysis is that accounting 
information will affect policy decisions.  In Part III, we report on recent 
research on public spending that empirically validates this assumption.  To 
further bolster our claim, however, we now briefly review the extensive 
research on accounting’s influence on spending by private firms. 
Consider the following example.  There are two identical companies 
with identical accounting requirements located in different jurisdictions.  Both 
companies provide identical pension benefits to their employees.  The 
provision of this benefit and the cost of doing so are widely known.  Now, 
suppose that the regulator in one jurisdiction decides that companies in his 
jurisdiction must include the cost of employee pensions as a reduction in 
financial statement income.  Such a change has no effect on the economic 
cost to the firm of providing pension benefits.  The only difference is a 
financial reporting requirement.  As a result, one might think that this change 
will not affect firm behavior.  Yet research shows that such a requirement 
does affect firm behavior. 
Numerous empirical studies show that requiring the inclusion of 
pension costs in the company’s financial statements will decrease the 
allocation of employee compensation related to pension benefits.  For example, 
when SFAS 10677 mandated the recognition of postemployment benefits for 
the first time, there was a significant decline in the number of companies that 
 
77. See Christian Leuz & Robert E. Verrecchia, The Economic Consequences of Increased Disclosure, 
38 J. ACCT. RES. 91 (2000). 
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offered this benefit to its workforce.78  Similarly, SFAS 123R79 preceded a 
significant decline in the use of stock options,80 and SFAS 15881 preceded a decline 
in the number of companies that provided pension benefits.82  In each case, 
the new accounting standard increased the costs that had to be recorded on 
the company’s financial statements and led to a reduction in the provision of the 
affected benefit.  These studies demonstrate that accounting has real economic 
consequences.83 
Additional studies also suggest that a firm subject to increased disclosure 
requirements will experience positive capital market consequences.  This 
occurs because improved disclosure reduces the information asymmetry 
between the company and its investors, which in turn reduces the company’s 
cost of capital.  For example, Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) find that German 
companies have smaller bid-ask spreads and higher trading volume when they 
voluntarily adopt more onerous disclosure requirements by switching from 
German GAAP to an international reporting regime.84  More generally, Hail 
and Leuz (2006) find that companies in countries with more extensive 
disclosure requirements, stronger securities regulation, and stricter enforcement 
mechanisms have a significantly lower cost of capital.85   
D. Good vs. Perfect Accounting 
In advocating a movement to an accrual accounting system similar to 
FASB, we are not claiming that accrual accounting is perfect or that 
reasonable people could not disagree about details of the accrual accounting 
rules.  In particular, with respect to expenditures of uncertain value, such as 
 
78. H. Fred Mittelstaedt, William D. Nichols & Philip R. Regier, SFAS No. 106 and Benefit 
Reductions in Employer-Sponsored Retiree Health Care Plans, 70 ACCT. REV. 535, 535–56 (1995). 
79. Summary of Statement No. 123 (Revised 2004), FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., 
http://www.fasb.org/summary/stsum123r.shtml (last visited Aug. 20, 2014). 
80. Lawrence D. Brown & Yen-Jung Lee, Changes in Option-Based Compensation Around the 
Issuance of SFAS 123R, 38 J. BUS. FIN. & ACCT. 1053, 1053–95 (2011). 
81. Summary of Statement No. 158, FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., http://www.fasb.org/ 
summary/stsum158.shtml (last visited Aug. 20, 2014). 
82. Cathy Beaudoin, Nandini Chandar & Edward M. Werner, Are Potential Effects of SFAS 158 
Associated With Firms’ Decisions to Freeze Their Defined Benefit Pension Plans?, 9 REV. ACCT. 
& FIN. 424 (2010). 
83. These studies do not try to examine whether the new accounting standards increased social welfare.  
They only show that companies respond to accounting requirements even though those 
requirements have no effect on the economics of the benefits that are being provided to 
employees.   
84. See Leuz & Verrecchia, supra note 77, at 121. 
85. Luzi Hail & Christian Leuz, International Differences in the Cost of Equity Capital: Do Legal 
Institutions and Security Regulations Matter?, 44 J. ACCT. RES. 485, 488 (2006). 
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R&D,86 there is always a tradeoff between reliability—faithfully recording 
historical transactions—and relevance—recording information in a manner 
than conveys economic reality.87  But we believe that accrual accounting is the 
most effective approach for financial reporting in general, especially for public 
entities. 
There are multiple reasons why accrual accounting is preferable to cash 
accounting.  First, cash accounting is not an effective alternative if the 
objective is to measure the economic condition of the reporting entity.88  
While cash accounting does not present several of the prominent difficulties 
of accrual accounting since its flows are easily measured, it also does not 
provide much information about the viability of the entity.  Cash is almost 
meaningless for evaluating long-term performance.  For example, we may 
observe that a person just received $100, but if we do not know whether this 
was a lottery win or a loan at an exorbitant interest rate, then we do not know 
if the person’s financial position has improved or deteriorated as a result of the 
payment, let alone by how much.  Using accrual measures, we may not 
capture this improvement or deterioration completely, but at least it is 
captured.  In other words, accrual measures may be imperfect, but they are 
certainly better than cash measures to represent the entity’s long-term 
financial situation.  Having a reporting regime that ensures the transparent 
reporting of cash and accrual accounting is vastly superior to the current 
GASB system.89 
Moreover, the most frequent complaints about FASB accounting do not 
generally apply to public sector entities.  Adjustments for deferred tax positions,90 
 
86. Research and Development (R&D) is comprised of investigative activities into the 
development of new products or procedures or into improvements in current products and 
procedures.  The standard financial accounting practice for R&D costs in the United States is 
to expense these costs as incurred.  REVSINE ET AL., supra note 18, at 565.  On average, most 
companies spend only a small percentage of their revenue on R&D (usually under 5 percent).  
Pharmaceuticals and high-tech companies tend to spend quite a bit more. 
87. REVSINE ET AL., supra note 18, at 565–66. 
88. Id. at 59. 
89. But see Peter A. Diamond & Peter R. Orszag, Accrual Accounting for Social Security, 41 HARV. 
J. ON LEGIS. 173, 182 (2004). 
90. Deferred tax assets and liabilities arise because of differences in the tax accounting and financial 
accounting systems.  A company calculates its tax expense based on its accounting income.  
The actual tax payment to the IRS, however, is based on the taxable income.  The difference 
between the tax expense and the actual tax payment gives rise to either a deferred tax asset or 
a deferred tax liability.  Public entities do not pay taxes, and therefore this adjustment simply 
does not apply. 
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inventory,91 and lease arrangements either do not apply or only apply in a very 
limited way to the public sector.92  Similarly, adjustments for expenditures 
that will generate uncertain future revenue, such as research and development 
(R&D) or advertising,93 are unlikely to make much difference.  Most public 
entities have budgets for such expenditures that are only a small percentage of 
overall spending, the expenditures are generally consistent year-to-year, and 
the uncertain revenue streams are often short term in nature.94  Finally, it is 
worth noting that competing approaches to accruals, such as the Economic 
Value Added (EVA) approach advocated by the consulting firm Stern 
Stewart & Company,95 have empirically performed worse than accruals at 
explaining future stock price performance.96  
Rather than debating these points in the abstract, we prefer to illustrate 
what we consider to be the failings of the GASB financial reporting system 
with concrete examples.  We believe that these examples will demonstrate the 
superiority of an accrual accounting approach. 
 
91. The First In, First Out (FIFO) method assumes the first items you purchased or produced 
are the first items you sold, consumed, or otherwise disposed of.  Therefore, inventory is 
valued based on the most recent purchases.  The Last In, First Out (LIFO) method assumes 
the items you have most recently purchased or produced are the first items you sold, 
consumed, or otherwise disposed of.  Therefore, inventory is valued based on the first items 
that were purchased.  This can result in inventory levels lower than the market value of 
inventory. 
92. RUPPEL, supra note 16. 
93. For example, the tourism budgets for all fifty states totaled $405 million for the 2012 fiscal 
year, which reflects a very small percentage of overall government spending.  Moreover, 
tourism advertisements are primarily designed to generate tourists right away.  Therefore, any 
future revenue attributed to current year spending would be small and any adjustments across 
periods would essentially offset each other. 
94. Cf., e.g., JOHN CHIANG, CAL. STATE CONTROLLER’S OFFICE, STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 
30, 2013 (2014) (making no mention of advertising or R&D); STATE OF MICHIGAN STATE 
BUDGET OFFICE, STATE OF MICHIGAN COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCIAL 
REPORT: FISCAL YEAR ENDED SEPTEMBER 30, 2013 (2013) (also making no mention of 
advertising or R&D). 
95. See Justin Pettit, EVA & Strategy, STERN STEWART & CO. RES. 4–5 (Apr. 2000), 
http://www.sternstewart.com.br/publicacoes/pdfs/EVA_and_strategy.pdf. 
96. See, e.g., Gary C. Biddle, Robert M. Bowen & James S. Wallace, Does EVA Beat Earnings? 
Evidence on Associations With Stock Returns and Firm Values, 24 J. ACCT. & ECON., 301, 331–
33 (1997).  This study is noteworthy because the companies in the empirical test were actual 
users of the EVA model, and the data that the researchers were using was actually provided 
by Stern Stewart & Company, who developed EVA. 
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II. GASB’S DEPARTURES FROM ESTABLISHED ACCOUNTING 
NORMS AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES 
We now describe the shortcomings of GASB relative to the best 
possible reporting regime sketched above.  We first explain the main failings 
of GASB in the abstract, before turning to concrete examples of suboptimal 
policy choices hidden and caused by these failings.  Our goal is to justify our 
ultimate proposal of SEC oversight, rather than to provide detailed proposals 
for concrete accounting rule changes.  We therefore focus most of our 
attention on the concrete examples, as these are easier to understand and 
evaluate than GASB’s abstract shortcomings. 
A. Faulty Rules and Principles 
GASB requires the production of two financial statements—the 
Statement of Net Assets and the Statement of Activities.97  The Statement of 
Net Assets presents the financial position as of the last day of the fiscal year.98  
This statement is similar to a Balance Sheet prescribed by FASB, as it 
displays the total assets and liabilities of the state.99  The Statement of 
Activities summarizes the “flows” during the fiscal year.100  This statement is 
similar to the Income Statement prescribed by FASB, as it reports the overall 
difference between inflows and outflows.101  While the GASB has some 
similarities to FASB, it has crucial shortcomings.  
1. Insufficient Separation and Linkage of Information 
GASB lacks the equivalent of a Cash Flow Statement.102  There is 
nothing in the current governmental regime that allows a user to reconcile the 
cash-based performance of the budget with the accrual-based performance of 
the financial statements.103  This omission is inconsistent with an effective 
accounting regime.  As the publisher example illustrated, understanding how 
the accrual-based measure reconciles to the cash-based measure is a critical 
component of any performance evaluation. 
 
97. RUPPEL, supra note 16, at 126. 
98. Id. at 127–32. 
99. Id. at 131–32. 
100. Id. at 295. 
101. Id. at 132–33. 
102. Id. at 185. 
103. Id. at 201–03. 
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While some aspects of the GASB regime provide information about an 
entity’s financial viability using accrual based accounting, it is not possible to 
understand the performance of the general fund—the object of the budget—
on an accrual basis. GASB 34 mandates a reconciliation of governmental 
funds to the changes in net assets,104 which has some similarity to the indirect 
cash flow statement mandated by FASB.105  But this reconciliation aggregates 
all governmental funds, such that the change in the general fund is impossible 
to determine.106  In particular, the budget provides expenditure data by 
category—for example, healthcare or education—whereas the reconciliation 
typically focuses on types of expense—for example, pension or employment 
benefits.107  This makes it virtually impossible to identify specific expenditures 
or revenues that differ on a cash versus an accrual basis.108 
Similarly, the Statement of Activities does not separate expenses and 
revenues into recurring and non-recurring items.109  In addition, items are 
often recorded in the Statement of Activities by function—for example, park 
district—rather than type—for example, employee wages.110  Since non-recurring 
 
104. Summary of Statement No. 34, supra note 22, at 31. 
105. RUPPEL, supra note 16, at 184–85 (noting that the reconciliation provides a means to 
comparing actual fund flows with the comprehensive annual report). 
106. See, e.g., Elizabeth Lynam, Testimony Before the Select Committee on Budget and Tax Reform on 
Improving Transparency, Forecasting and Flexibility in New York State's Budgetary Process 
(Dec. 17, 2009), available at http://www.nysenate.gov/files/pdfs/Lyman.pdf (noting that 
current financial reporting “provides a cash-to-GAAP reconciliation that is virtually 
unintelligible” and that budget “prepared by the Division of the Budget should be 
accompanied by a detailed explanation of the differences [from accruals] so that postponed 
commitments and revenue shortfalls are easily identified”). 
107. Summary of Statement No. 34, supra note 22, at 87. 
108. For illustration, suppose that half of higher education spending is on salaries for professors 
and support staff at universities.  Suppose that these individuals earn a pension benefit that is 
worth 20 percent of their pay.  Therefore, 10 percent of the budget is for pension benefits, 
which for 2012 amounts to around $1.1 billion.  Now, suppose that California does not 
actually make this contribution.  The benefits have still been earned, so on an accrual basis, 
the budget would have $1.1 billion of pension benefits included.  But on a cash basis there is 
no cost included since no contribution was actually made.  Ideally, this deferral would show 
up explicitly on the reconciliation.  There would be a positive adjustment for an amount owed 
(on an accrual basis) but not yet paid (in cash).  But what actually shows up is the “net pension 
obligation,” which is the change in the excess of the pension liabilities over the pension assets, for 
all governmental units.  This is not the same item.  It is not possible to identify what portion 
of this amount is attributable to higher education, nor what amount is related to the specific 
accrual during 2012.  Similarly, it is not clear whether this difference arose because earned 
benefits were not funded or there was some other actuarial gain or loss during the year—for 
example, poor investment performance. 
109. RUPPEL, supra note 16, at 132–37. 
110. See Summary of Statement No. 34, supra note 22, at 17 (stating that governmental activities 
should be presented by function and business-type activities by segment). 
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items—for instance, the sale of a state owned asset—can be bundled with the 
total revenues or expenses of a function, the identification of the performance 
of the state absent non-recurring items is not straightforward.111 
Relatedly, GASB only requires financial statements for one year at a 
time, and does not require that financial statements for prior years be 
prepared using the same accounting methods as the financial statements for 
the current year.112  This is in contrast with FASB, which requires that 
financial performance data always be provided for the last two or three years 
using the same accounting principles and methods from period to period.113  
This so-called consistency principle allows financial statement users to 
evaluate the progression of the private reporting entity’s financial situation 
from year to year, unconfounded by changes in accounting practices.114  The 
absence of this requirement in GASB allows public reporting entities to 
camouflage changes in their situation by changing their accounting choices.115  
These types of distortions are closely related to the deviation from true accrual 
accounting. 
2. Incomplete Implementation of Accruals 
By far the gravest shortcoming is GASB’s incomplete implementation 
of accrual accounting.  Under GASB, most routine transactions that mirror 
those found in the private sector—for example, running a parking garage—
generally follow some accrual accounting principles.116  There are a number of 
 
111. RUPPEL, supra note 16, at 136–37. 
112. See GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT NO. 62 OF THE 
GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD 34 (2010) (stating that for changes 
in accounting principle prior period financial statements should be included as previously 
reported). 
113. Information must be provided for the last two years of balance sheet and three years of 
income statement and cash flow statement. 
114. REVSINE ET AL., supra note 18, at 76–83. 
115. See, e.g., Eileen Norcross, Fiscal Evasion in State Budgeting 15–17 (Mercatus Ctr. Geo. Mason U., 
Working Paper No. 10-39, 2010).  For example, a state can move up the due dates on merchant-
collected sales taxes from early next year to late in the current year, thus allowing these taxes to be 
counted as revenues for the current year.  See Michael Granof, Stupid Budget Tricks, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 9, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/09/opinion/09granof.html?pagewanted=print).  
In an extreme case, this can result in doubling of recorded revenue.  To illustrate, consider a 
case where all tax receipts of $100 are due and received on January 1 (the first day of the fiscal 
year).  If the due date is moved to December 31 (the last day of the fiscal year), then the 
revenue in the implementation year is $200—the $100 received on January 1 and the $100 
received on December 31.  This doubling of revenue occurs even though actual tax receipts 
continue at $100 per year. 
116. OFFICE FIN. MGMT., Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, http://www.ofm.wa.gov/policy/ 
80.20.htm (last visited Aug. 20, 2014). 
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important ways, however, in which GASB deviates from full accrual 
accounting.  These deviations often resemble a cash-based rather than an 
accrual-based approach to financial statement recognition.117  The examples 
we present in the following section are due to this shortcoming.  As a result, 
the suboptimal decisions we describe will not be transparent even if the 
previous shortcomings were fixed. 
The most prominent and numerically important example of incomplete 
accrual accounting is the GASB approach for pension obligations.  This 
deviation from accrual accounting by itself has resulted in public sector 
financial reports that understate the cost of pensions by several trillion dollars.  
According to a recent Moody’s report, the median U.S. state’s unfunded 
pension liability as a fraction of annual state revenue is 45 percent.118  For 
some states, the situation is far bleaker.  For example, Illinois would need 241 
percent of its annual revenue to plug its pension gap.119  From the perspective 
of this Article, the key point is that these numbers are far worse than states’ 
official financial reports would lead one to believe.120 
Consider the following example.  A newly hired forty-year-old worker 
earns an annuity benefit of $1000 a year payable when he reaches age sixty-
five as a result of completing his first year of employment.  Under FASB 
rules, the company has to record an expense that reflects the cost of this 
retirement benefit, which is equal to the present value of an annuity of $1000 
 
117. For example, retiree medical benefits are typically recognized during retirement rather than as 
something that is earned during an employee’s working career. 
118. See Wagner & Lombardi, supra note 28, at 1. 
119. See Wagner & Lombardi, supra note 28, at 2. 
120. For example, Illinois’ reported unfunded liability is roughly $85 billion, which represents a funded 
ratio of about 50 percent.  This does not include $26 billion in bonds issued to fund the 
pension plan, see Amanda Griffin-Johnson, Illinois’ Pension Bonds, ILL. POL’Y INSTITUTE 
TAX & BUDGET BRIEF 1 (Oct. 20, 2011), http://ghost.illinoispolicy.org.php53-9.dfw1-
1.websitetestlink.com/wp-content/files_mf/1378246591pensionbonds1020.pdf, but does 
reflect numerous gimmicks employed to understate the pension liability.  See Mary Williams 
Walsh, The Illusion of Pension Savings, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2010, at B1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/18/business/18pension.html?_r=3&ref=business&src=me
&pagewanted=print.  Similarly, the unfunded liability in the June 30, 2011, actuarial 
valuation report for the City of Detroit was roughly $640 million, which represented a 
funded ratio of about 92 percent.  CITY OF DETROIT PROPOSAL FOR CREDITORS 23, 31 
(June 14, 2013), available at http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/713693/detroit-
emergency-manager-kevyn-orrs-report-to.pdf.  The City of Detroit Proposal for Creditors, 
dated June 14, 2013, states that “Aggressive Actuarial Assumptions” means that the $640 
million unfunded liability is “substantially understated” and that a more reasonable estimate is 
closer to $3.5 billion.  See id.  For additional related discussion, see Cory Eucalitto, The Real 
Size of Detroit’s Pension Funding Gap, ST. BUDGET SOLUTIONS (July 15, 2013), 
http://www.statebudgetsolutions.org/publications/detail/the-real-size-of-detroits-pension-
funding-gap. 
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payable at age sixty-five.  A typical fixed income discount rate is around 4 percent, 
so the present value of $1000 a year for life starting in twenty-five years is 
about $4500.  This is the price the employer would have to pay a financial 
firm to assume the pension obligation at market rates.  It is also the expense 
recorded under FASB.  
In contrast, GASB would discount the future annuity benefit using a 
rate based on the expected investment return.121  Suppose that the pension 
trust established to fund the pension promise is invested 50 percent in equity 
and 50 percent in fixed income, and that the expected returns for those asset 
classes are 10 percent and 4 percent, respectively.  GASB would then 
discount the future annuity benefit at 7 percent,122 which would result in a 
present value of about $2000.  This amount represents the expense that is 
ultimately recorded under GASB.  Hence, in this example, the state was able 
to provide a benefit that is worth $4500 but only record an expense of $2000.123 
To see why this is wrong, consider what would happen if the trust were 
to reallocate its investments into 100 percent equity.  Then the expected 
return on the pension fund assets would be 10 percent.  Under GASB, this 
would now be the appropriate discount rate for the pension obligation.124  At 
a discount rate of 10 percent, the annuity benefit starting in twenty-five years 
would be worth less than $1000.  According to GASB, the government can 
change the value of the pension obligation by changing the investment of the 
pension assets.  Clearly, this is does not accurately reflect the state’s pension 
obligation.125 
 
121. GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT NO. 25 OF THE GOVERN-
MENTAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD 18–19 (1994). 
122. Seven percent is the expected investment return on a portfolio that is 50 percent equity and 
50 percent fixed income, where the expected return on equity is 10 percent and the expected 
return on fixed income is 4 percent.  The specific calculation is: 50% x 10% + 50% x 4%. 
123. The reporting regime for postretirement welfare coverage is even more extreme.  For example, 
Detroit did not report any such obligation prior to its bankruptcy filing as GASB does not require 
that postretirement welfare benefits be reported.  Upon filing for bankruptcy, Detroit reported 
postretirement welfare obligations of $5.7 billion.  This is in direct contrast with FASB, which has 
required an accrual based measure of postretirement welfare costs since 1994.  See Summary of 
Statement No. 106, FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., http://www.fasb.org/summary/ 
stsum106.shtml (last visited Aug. 20, 2014). 
124. GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT NO. 67 OF THE GOVERN-
MENTAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD 19–20 (2012). 
125. Consider the following quote from Kent Smetters, professor of business economics and public 
policy at Wharton: “State and local pensions are not covered under any reasonable accounting 
standards.  Their accounting makes Enron look pretty good.”  Public Sector Pensions: ‘Their Accounting 
Makes Enron Look Good’, KAW (Sept. 26, 2012), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/ 
article/public-sector-pensions-their-accounting-makes-enron-look-good. 
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B. Examples of Obscured Policy Choices 
We now highlight a series of suboptimal policy choices concealed and 
arguably triggered by the shortcomings of the current GASB regime.  Our 
goal in this Part is not to provide an exhaustive list of all the transactions 
where the GASB financial reporting implementation reflects inaccurate 
accrual accounting.  Rather, we focus on three specific transactions that occur 
frequently and that have profound negative economic consequences.  We focus 
on inefficient asset sales, distorted pay incentives, and unreasonable risk-
taking.  We describe each type of transaction in more detail below and outline 
how the accounting and disclosure requirements for public entities conceal 
the use of these suboptimal policy choices. 
1. Inefficient Asset Sales and Leases 
“If a governor told you there were a way to spread pork, raise funds for 
infrastructure investment, promote jobs, avoid raising taxes, and put a dent in 
the trade deficit—all in one fell swoop—you might think he had a bridge to 
sell you.  And you'd be right.”126 
States can improve their reported financial condition on GASB 
statements through the sale or lease of assets such as highways and parks or by 
selling future revenue streams from activities such as lotteries, toll roads, or 
parking garages.127  This is because these assets or the present value of the 
future streams of revenue that they generate are typically not reported on a 
current market value basis on the Statement of Net Assets.128  Thus any sale 
or lease, even at a grossly inadequate price, can have a positive effect on the 
state’s financial condition, as if the state has generated no value through the 
sale or lease.129 
Consider a recent transaction from 2006 where Indiana entered into a 
seventy-five-year lease for its main toll road with a group of foreign investors 
for $3.85 billion.130  If the value of the toll road and the associated toll receipts 
were reported on the financial statements on a current market basis, a fairly 
 
126. Daniel Gross, Lost Highway, SLATE, http://www.slate.com/articles/business/moneybox/2006/03/ 
lost_highway.html (last visited Aug. 20, 2014). 
127. RUPPEL, supra note 16. 
128. Id. 
129. Id. 
130. TIM BERRY, OFFICE OF IND. AUDITOR OF STATE, STATE OF INDIANA COMPREHENSIVE 
ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 2007, at 11, 163–
64 (2007). 
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priced transaction would have had little financial statement impact.  The only 
consequence would have been that a cash item—namely, the $3.85 billion—
would replace a tangible asset of the same value on the statement of net assets. The 
replacement would not have an impact on the statement of activities.  But because 
the value was not recorded in the GASB financial statements, Indiana was 
able to record the cash payments received as part of the sale as a financial 
windfall.131  In essence, it was as if money materialized out of nowhere.132 
One of the most troubling aspects of these types of transactions is the 
fact that the GASB financial windfall does not depend on receiving a fair 
price.  Assume for the sake of argument that the Indiana toll road was worth 
$10 billion (a number derived by discounting all expected future toll income 
to present value).  At that value, the sale for $3.85 billion was a massive 
economic loss of $6.15 billion.  And yet, the sale allowed Indiana to show a 
purported $3.85 billion improvement of its financial situation.  To be sure, 
Indiana’s liquidity position improved as a result of the sale as it now has more 
liquid cash on hand.  But in value terms, the sale was a loss.  An effective 
accounting system should reflect this scenario. 
The inability to reflect the economic loss is significant because it is likely 
that these asset sales generate economic losses, even though the GASB 
treatment is favorable.  Asset sales can only occur when there is a perceived 
benefit to both parties.  When a potential buyer offers more than the value 
that a state perceives, the buyer must think that they can generate more 
money from the asset by operating it more efficiently than the state or by 
 
131. In the Indiana case, the state recorded proceeds of $3.618 billion related to the lease of the 
toll road in its 2007 Comprehensive Annual Financial Report.  See id. 
132. In principle, such a situation can also arise under FASB, if and to the extent that 
economically valuable assets (such as brand recognition or research results) are not recorded 
as such.  FASB applies more stringent criteria, however, in determining whether there has 
indeed been a sale.  In Indiana’s case, FASB would most likely record an asset (for the cash 
received from outside investors) and a liability (for the obligation to transfer the future toll 
receipts to the outside investors), while leaving revenue unchanged.  The reason for this 
accounting treatment is that the state still plays a role in the generation of the toll receipts 
(the future revenue). 
  GASB has now recognized this issue as well and partially addressed it through the 
issuance of GASB 48 in September 2006.  GASB 48 provides criteria that determine whether 
a particular transaction involving pledged revenue is a “sale” or “collateralized borrowing,” which in 
turn determines whether additional revenue can be recorded in the year of the transaction as 
was done in the Indiana example.  GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., 
STATEMENT NO. 48 OF THE GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD 2 
(2006).  This standard allows a state to record a transaction as a sale as long as it is not 
involved in the fundamental activity that generates the revenue.  Id. at 5.  FASB would likely 
have a stricter interpretation, under which involvement in the future revenue would need to 
be both estimable and de minimis to record the transaction as a sale. 
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increasing revenue.  That begs the question of why the state could not do the 
same thing.133  Several municipal entities that have recently entered bankruptcy 
under Chapter 9 had asset sales in earlier periods that eventually led to 
reduced revenue in later periods.134  In some cases, the desire to sell assets is 
strongest in the period immediately before the bankruptcy filing.135  
To grasp the problem in its entirety, one also needs to consider how 
government spending responds to the asset sale or lease.  Even though the 
sale potentially damaged the state’s financial health, it also inflated reported 
revenue.  As a result, politicians may be tempted to commit to additional 
spending initiatives.  Therefore, even though resources were essentially reshuffled, 
with some loss in the process, politicians may commit to a level of spending 
that will drive the need for similar future transactions.136  We discuss GASB’s 
effect on spending in the following section. 
2. Distorted Spending 
Distortions in GASB reporting mean that inaccurate information is 
being used to make decisions that have economic consequences.  
Governments rely on GASB accounting as a foundation for certain policy 
choices, such as how to compensate public sector workers and whether to hire 
additional workers.  For example, in its centralized budgeting process, 
Massachusetts derives a fully burdened rate for employees137 using 
 
133. Consider the following: “In 2008, for example, Chicago Mayor Richard Daley auctioned off the 
city's 36,000 parking meters to a private investment group that included Morgan Stanley, the Abu 
Dhabi Investment Authority and the German-based insurance giant Allianz.  Daley did it to balance 
the budget.  The deal may cost Chicago drivers at least $11.6 billion over the next 75 years, 10 times 
what the system was sold for, according to Bloomberg News.  Since the deal went through, 
Morgan Stanley has raised parking fees 42 percent.  It now plans on stuffing more cars into 
fewer metered spaces by getting rid of marking lines, raising the number of metered slots and 
expanding the hours that require fees.  City auditors dubbed the parking deal ‘dubious’ because the 
city's chief financial officer didn't calculate how much the system would be worth to the city over 
the long term.”  Michelle Conlin, States and Cities Selling Public Assets to Cover Their Costs, 
CNSNEWS.COM (May 13, 2011, 9:04 AM), http://cnsnews.com/news/article/states-and-cities-
selling-public-assets-cover-their-costs#sthash.43ck1oR2.dpuf. 
134. See, e.g., Brian Chappatta et al., Detroit Peddles Its Municipal Assets to Avoid Record Bankruptcy, 
BLOOMBERG (June 14, 2013, 9:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-
14/detroit-on-bankruptcy-s-brink-stops-paying-some-debts-orr-says.html. 
135. See, e.g., id.; Conlin, supra note 133. 
136. Cf. Gregory Korte, State of the States: What to Do With Their Surpluses, USA TODAY (Jan. 29, 
2014, 4:14 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2014/01/29/state-of-the-
state-addresses-2014/4944317 (discussing the recent return of budget surpluses for some states). 
137. The fully burdened rate is the total cost of all benefits.  For example, a fully burdened rate of 
20 percent implies that the total cost of an employee with a $50,000 salary is $60,000, which 
is calculated by multiplying the employee salary by one plus the fully burdened rate. 
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information derived from GASB financial statements.138  As a result, 
distortions in GASB reporting can result in policy choices that are based on 
inaccurate information.  These distortions are particularly large for 
postemployment benefits, such as pensions and retiree healthcare.139  This 
occurs because GASB develops pension costs using an estimate of the cash 
contribution requirement, rather than using the actual economic value of the 
provided benefits, as is done under FASB.140  When postemployment 
benefits are understated, labor appears less expensive than it actually is.  This 
can lead to an overinvestment in workers, relative to the resources the state 
has available. 
Naughton et al. empirically confirm these fears.141  They constructed 
twenty years of data for each of the fifty states.142  For each state, they collected 
information on the reported GASB pension costs.143  Then they calculated 
what the costs would have been if the states were required to use FASB.144  
They examined whether large deviations between the reported GASB and 
hypothetical FASB amounts lead to increased labor expenditures in future 
periods.145  Their regressions results show a positive association between the 
current difference between the GASB and FASB costs and future 
employment costs, and they found that this association becomes stronger over 
time.146  The increasing significance of the positive relationship is consistent 
with states hiring too many workers each and every period, such that total 
expenditures are substantially higher several years in the future. 
The additional costs they documented are substantial.  Their regressions 
indicate that a $1000 per capita understatement due to the deviation of 
GASB from FASB accounting is associated with a per capita increase of $11 
in public employee payrolls in the next three to five years.147  This has startling 
repercussions for states.  During the sample period, the average understatement 
 
138. See Leslie A. Kirwan, Fringe Benefits, Payroll Taxes and Indirect Costs (ANF 5), MASS.GOV, 
http://www.mass.gov/anf/budget-taxes-and-procurement/admin-bulletins/fringe-benefits-
payroll-taxes-and-indirect.html (last visited Aug. 20, 2014) (“Department heads are 
responsible for budgeting these [fringe benefit] costs from the applicable funds.”).  The fringe 
benefit cost for retirement plans for 2010 was 6.16 percent. 
139. Naughton et al., supra note 15, at 12–13. 
140. Id. 
141. Id. at 22. 
142. Id. at 23. 
143. Id. 
144. Id. at 13. 
145. Id. at 33. 
146. Id. at 29–33. 
147. Id. at 30. 
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of pension liabilities due to GASB’s deviation from FASB was about $1978 
per capita.148  The average state has about 5.7 million citizens.149  Thus, an 
average state spent an extra $125 million on hiring employees due to the 
misleading GASB methodology.150  While the states received the services of 
the additional state workers, these benefits were presumably not worth the 
cost since the states hired these workers only because their costs were 
understated.  This finding is very important because it shows that the harm 
associated with ineffective accounting is not limited to the reporting of 
inaccurate obligations.  Rather, it illustrates that reporting of inaccurate 
obligations leads to other choices that increase future costs.  Therefore, it is 
not only the case that the current GASB regime poses distributional fairness 
issues, but also that it leads to policy choices that have the potential to 
exacerbate future fiscal problems. 
In addition to understating the cost of hiring new workers, the current 
GASB regime also does not provide transparency into pension benefit 
improvements.  Under GASB, the pension contribution is typically made up 
of two components: the contribution requirement associated with the benefits 
accrued during the year and the contribution requirement associated with 
previously unfunded benefits.151  When a state provides a benefit improvement, 
this increases the actuarial contribution to the pension plan.  From the 
outside, however, it is unclear whether the increased contribution is due to 
benefit improvements or to a deviation in an actuarial assumption—for 
example, if the pension assets earned less than their expected investment 
return.152  This is in sharp contrast with FASB and the principles of accrual 
 
148. Id. 
149. Id. at 26. 
150. See id. at 30 (discussing the coefficients of 5.7 million average state population, multiplied by 
a per capita increase of $11 in public employee payrolls, multiplied by a per capita liability 
understatement of $1978, and divided by $1000 per capita understatement equaling an extra 
$125 million spent on hiring employees). 
151. GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT NO. 27 OF THE GOVERN-
MENTAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD 6 (1994) (“The [ARC] should include the 
employer’s normal cost and a provision(s) for amortizing the total unfunded actuarial accrued 
liability.”). 
152. Cf. Mary Williams Walsh, Detroit Spent Billions Extra on Pensions, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2013, 
3:08 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/09/25/undisclosed-payments-cost-detroit-pension-
plan-billions (quoting a managing director at the firm of Conway MacKenzie, Mr. Moore: 
“[h]undreds of millions of dollars of plan assets intended to support the city’s traditional 
defined benefit pension arrangements were converted to provide a windfall to the annuity 
savings accounts of active employees outside of the defined benefit pension plan”).  
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accounting, which require that any deviations from prior benefit formulas or 
any early retirement provisions be explicitly reported as a separate expense item.153 
Municipal governments can rely on this lack of transparency to provide 
for generous extra payments to certain individuals without public awareness.  
For example, Detroit recently revealed that its system has provided 
considerable extra payments over the past fifteen years.154  These payments 
only came to light because of the additional investigative audits done as part 
of its bankruptcy filing.155  While there is no conclusive proof, it is possible 
that many other states and municipalities have undertaken similar activities. 
3. Excessive Risk Taking 
As explained above, the GASB cost of providing pension benefits is 
inversely related to the expected return on the pension plan’s investments.156  
Investments present a tradeoff of risk and return.157  For a higher expected 
return, an investor must accept higher risk, and vice versa.158  Thus, states can 
reduce their reported pension obligations by increasing the risk on the 
pension fund investments.159  State exploitation of this loophole is the best 
explanation for two worrisome empirical findings.  First, public sector plans 
have higher equity exposures making them riskier than private sector plans.160  
More importantly, the equity allocations increase or are diverted to even 
 
153. See FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING 
STANDARDS NO. 87: EMPLOYERS’ ACCOUNTING FOR PENSIONS ¶ 261, illus. 5 (1985) 
(Accounting for a Plan Curtailment When Termination Benefits Are Offered to 
Employees). 
154. Consider the following excerpt: “Detroit’s municipal pension fund made payments for 
decades to retirees, active workers and others above and beyond normal benefits, costing the 
struggling city billions of dollars and helping push it into bankruptcy, according to people 
who have reviewed the payments.  The payments, which were not publicly disclosed, 
included bonuses to retirees, supplements to workers not yet retired and cash to the families 
of workers who died before becoming eligible to collect a pension, according to reports by an 
outside actuary and other people with knowledge of the matter.”  Walsh, supra note 152. 
155. See Matthew Dolan, Report Faults Detroit Pension Funds, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 26, 2013), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303796404579099524149455810 (An investigat-
ive report commissioned by Kevyn Orr one month prior to the bankruptcy filing found that “the 
city's largest pension fund had questionable interest rates applied to annuities. Investigators 
also raised concerns about bonuses paid even when the funds lost value.”).  
156. Andonov et al., supra note 31, at 9. 
157. ZVI BODIE, ALEX KANE, & ALAN MARCUS, INVESTMENTS 2 (9th ed. 2010). 
158. Id. at 3.  
159. Id. 
160. Id. at 3–4. 
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riskier asset classes during periods of fiscal stress.161  Second, Andonov et al. 
find that in a comparison of public pension plans around the world, only U.S. 
pension plans invest heavily in risky assets, with most in equity.162  Private and 
foreign countries’ pension plans are not subject to GASB’s approach to 
valuing pension obligations.163 
Besides encouraging excessive equity investment, the disconnect 
between the GASB cost of providing a pension benefit and the cost 
determined under an accrual basis has also led to states issuing what are called 
“Pension Obligation Bonds,” or POBs.164  States that issue POBs sell fixed 
income obligations with a coupon rate similar to the FASB rate.165  States 
then invest the proceeds, which are deposited in the pension plan, primarily 
in equities.166  The investment allows states to make its revenue look better 
because the reported cost of a pension benefit under GASB is based on an 
expected contribution, which is affected by the plan’s funding.167  The actual 
cost of the pension benefit does not depend on the funding.  Instead, the 
pension cost under GASB is equal to the “normal cost” plus an amortization 
of the unfunded pension liability.168  The normal cost is the present value of 
 
161. See, e.g., Michael Corkery, Public Pensions Increase Private-Equity Investments, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 26, 
2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203806504577181272061850732.html. 
162. Andonov et al., supra note 31, at 18–19. 
163. GASB, which stands for Governmental Accounting Standards Board, generates accounting 
standards solely for US state and local governments.  GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING 
STANDARDS BD., http://www.gasb.org./ (last visited Nov. 21, 2014). 
164. The bonds took on some notoriety this past summer when two California cities, Stockton and San 
Bernardino, went bankrupt.  Generous pensions awkwardly propped up with ill-timed Pension 
Obligation Bonds (POBs) contributed to both debacles.  See Mary Williams Walsh, How Plan to 
Help City Pay Pensions Backfired, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 3, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09 
/04/business/how-a-plan-to-help-stockton-calif-pay-pensions-backfired.html?pagewanted 
=all&_r=0. 
165. This is true of highly rated sellers, since the FASB rate approximates the AA corporate bond rate.  
Because municipalities are prohibited from selling tax-exempt bonds and investing the money to 
make more money, the bonds are sold in the taxable market.  As a result, there is no ability to issue at 
lower tax-exempt rates.  An interactive chart showing the relationship between state borrowing 
costs and the AAA rate can be found at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014240 
52748704858404576134090495990356?mod=googlewsj. 
166. Pew Charitable Trusts & Laura and John Arnold Found., State Public Pension Investments Shift Over 
Past 30 Years, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, June 2014, at 3, available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/ 
media/Assets/2014/06/PensionInvestments06032014.pdf. 
167. ALICIA H. MUNNELL ET AL., PENSION OBLIGATION BONDS: FINANCIAL CRISIS 
EXPOSES RISKS 3 (2010) (“POBs offer issuers an actuarial arbitrage opportunity.”). 
168. The GASB established in Statements 25 and 27 the actuarial parameters and reporting 
requirements for pension valuations, including calculation of the actual required contribution.  
GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF GOVERNMENTAL 
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 25: FINANCIAL REPORTING FOR DEFINED BENEFIT 
PENSION PLANS AND NOTE DISCLOSURES FOR DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PLANS 17 
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the plan benefits that were earned during the current plan year.169  In contrast, 
under FASB, the cost is based almost entirely on the value of the benefits 
earned during the year—consistent with accrual accounting principles—and 
therefore the cost is not affected by funding the plan with borrowed money.170 
Consider a pension plan that has an accrued pension liability171 of $100, 
pension assets of $50, and a normal cost172 of $5.  Assume that the 
amortization period is ten years, so that the amortization component is also 
$5.173  Consequently, the state that sponsors this plan would have to report a 
pension cost of $10, which is the sum of the $5 normal cost and $5 
amortization.  If the state issued $50 of POBs with a 4 percent coupon rate, 
the plan would be fully funded due to the additional $50 from the bond issue.  
Consequently, the amortization amount would fall to zero.  The state would 
have to make the coupon payment $2—namely, 4 percent of $50.  
Nevertheless, the net effect would be to reduce the state’s reported expenses 
to $7 ($2 coupon plus $5 normal cost) for an accounting gain of $3.  This 
accounting gain is an economic illusion, as the state has done nothing to 
reduce its economic costs.  
The fact that it is possible to have an accounting gain from the issuance 
of POBs is especially troubling when you consider that POBs are the state 
equivalent to gambling.  States that issue POBs incur an additional fixed 
obligation with a set payment schedule, but they invest the assets used to 
make these payments primarily in the stock market.174  States that issue POBs 
assume that they will earn more on their risky investments than they will 
have to pay investors,175 though some may not have a positive return at 
 
(1994); GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF GOVERN-
MENTAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 27: ACCOUNTING FOR PENSIONS BY STATE AND 
LOCAL GOVERNMENTAL EMPLOYERS 6 (1994). 
169. HOWARD WINKLEVOSS, PENSION MATHEMATICS WITH NUMERICAL ILLUSTRATION 
69–70 (1977). 
170. FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING 
STANDARDS NO. 87: EMPLOYERS’ ACCOUNTING FOR PENSIONS ¶ 44A (1985), amended 
by FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING 
STANDARDS NO. 158: EMPLOYERS’ ACCOUNTING FOR DEFINED BENEFIT PENSION 
AND OTHER POSTRETIREMENT PLANS (2006). 
171. The pension liability is the present value of all accrued pension benefits as of the valuation date. 
172. The normal cost is the present value of accrued pension benefits earned during the current year. 
173. Determined by dividing the pension assets of $50 by the amortization period of ten years. 
174. See PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS & LAURA AND JOHN ARNOLD FOUND., supra note 166. 
175. See, e.g., Press Release, The Office of State Treasurer, State of Conn., Nappier Announces Landmark 
Bond Sale 1 (Apr. 22, 2008), available at http://www.ott.ct.gov/pressreleases/press2008/ 
pr04222008_2.pdf (“We achieved a favorable borrowing cost of 5.88%, which is well below the 8.5% 
assumed long-term return on assets of the Teachers’ Retirement Fund.” (quoting Denise L. 
Nappier)). 
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all.176  The transaction is no different than an individual borrowing money 
and investing in the stock market—called leveraged investing—and it is a 
high risk strategy that increases the state’s risk profile.177 
In fact, POBs create exactly the type of leverage that politicians 
condemn when used by financial firms.178  Moreover, the way in which it 
increases risk is especially problematic for states because of the cyclicality of 
tax receipts.179  When the economy is performing poorly, asset returns are 
typically lower, creating a loss for the state as the interest obligations on the 
POB are set at the time of issuance.180  This is problematic because this tends 
to happen when tax receipts, the state’s primary source of revenue, are also at 
their lowest level.  The recent bankruptcy petition for Stockton, California, 
was due in large part to the use of POBs, and Detroit’s bankruptcy filing 
followed a missed POB payment.181 
III. THERE ARE NO GOOD REASONS FOR GASB’S DEPARTURES 
In the preceding Part, we illustrated several of the pernicious effects of 
GASB’s deviations from accrual accounting.  The deviations invite harmful 
 
176. ALICIA H. MUNNELL ET AL., supra note 167, at 4.  There are rare occasions when this has 
been true.  But for most issuers, this has turned out to be false.  This is because POBs are 
typically issued when states need money, which is generally a time when interest rates are 
high and, therefore, the odds of earning more in the stock market are less.  For example, 
Oakland issued a $417 million POB designed to buy the city a fifteen-year “holiday” from its 
police and fire pension contributions in 1997.  In 2010, Oakland’s city auditor did a careful 
analysis of the 1997 POB and found that the amount still owed by the City is roughly $250 
million higher than the scenario where the POBs were not issued in 1997 and the same 
payments were instead made to the pension fund.  See Jennifer Gollan, California Agencies 
Gamble on Pension Bonds to Cover Debts –and Lose, CTR. FOR INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING 
(Oct. 29, 2013), http://cironline.org/reports/california-agencies-gamble-pension-bonds-
cover-debts-%E2%80%93-and-lose-5443. 
177. Thad Calabrese, Public Pensions, Public Budgets, and the Risks of Pension Obligation Bonds, in 
SOCIETY OF ACTUARIES, PUBLIC PENSION FINANCE SYMPOSIUM 9–11 (2009). 
178. Consider the following quote, “‘It’s the dumbest idea I ever heard,’ Jon Corzine told Bloomberg.com 
in 2008 when he was still governor of New Jersey.  ‘It’s speculating the way I would have speculated 
in my bond position at Goldman Sachs.’”  Eric Schulzke, Pension Obligation Bonds: Risky Gimmick or 
Smart Investment?, GOVERNING STATES & LOCALITIES 1 (Jan. 2013), http://www.governing 
.com/topics/public-workforce/pensions/gov-pension-obligation-bonds-risky-or-smart.html.   
179. See Eric Schulzke, Pension Obligation Bonds: Risky Gimmick or Smart Investment?, GOVERNING 
(Jan. 2013), http://www.governing.com/topics/public-workforce/pensions/gov-pension-obligation-
bonds-risky-or-smart.html. 
180. For example, S&P returns during the two most recent recessions were negative.  Policy Basics: Where 
Do Federal Tax Revenues Come From?, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES (last updated 
Mar. 2014), http://www.cbpp.org/files/PolicyBasics_WhereDoFederalTaxRevsComeFrom_08-
20-12.pdf.  This coincided with reduced tax revenue and hence large deficits. 
181. See Walsh, supra note 164. 
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accounting gimmicks and obscure true financial positions, spectacularly so in 
the case of state pensions.  In this Part, we consider GASB’s claims that 
governments are so different from private companies that the accounting 
method utilized by private entities simply would not work.182  We contend 
that these arguments are weak at best.  There are no compelling reasons to 
deviate from a complete accrual approach to government accounting, even 
though the implementation of government accounting may have to differ in 
some details. 
The affirmative argument for our position is simple.  As we discussed in 
Part I, accrual accounting has evolved over centuries as the best, though 
imperfect, method of representing the evolution of an entity’s long-term 
financial position.  By GASB’s own admission, the long-term financial 
position is of even greater interest for governments than usually shorter-lived 
businesses.183  Governments also require measures of cash use, in particular 
for budgeting purposes.184  In an accrual accounting system, this is easily 
available in the form of the Cash Flow Statement.  The Cash Flow Statement 
reconciles the change in cash with the net income so that the budget based on 
accrual measures can be compared directly and effectively with the cash 
budget.185 
This Part addresses GASB’s claims of why government accounting 
should be different.  At least with respect to accrual accounting, each one of these 
claims are unconvincing for one or more of three broad classes of reasons.  
First, many claims argue for additional disclosures by governments, not 
different financial disclosures.  Second, many claims insist that government 
accounting must take a long view, but this is an argument for accrual accounting 
and against cash-based measures.  Third, the need for coordinating financial 
statements with cash-based state budgets is best met by providing pure cash 
 
182. GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., supra note 34. 
183. Cf. GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., supra note 25 (following its 
Concepts Statement No. 1, believing that financial information should be useful for citizens 
to assess whether there is “interperiod equity”; that is, whether current year revenues are 
sufficient to pay for services provided in the current year, and whether future taxpayers will 
bear the cost burden for services provided earlier). 
184. Budgets are based on cash.  According to the Office of Management and Budget: “The budget 
system of the United States Government provides the means for the President and Congress 
to decide how much money to spend, what to spend it on, and how to raise the money they 
have decided to spend.  Through the budget system, they determine the allocation of 
resources among the agencies of the Federal Government.  The budget system focuses 
primarily on dollars, but it also allocates other resources, such as Federal employment.”  The Budget 
System and Concepts, OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/ 
files/omb/budget/fy2005/pdf/concepts.pdf (last visited Nov. 21, 2014). 
185. REVSINE ET AL., supra note 18. 
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measures in a statement of cash flows.  By contrast, GASB’s current approach 
of injecting cash-based elements into a modified accrual system delivers 
neither a clear picture of the state’s cash position nor a clear picture of the 
state’s long-term economic position.186  By attempting to merge accruals and 
cash—two distinct measures—the GASB approach produces distorted financial 
results that incentivize suboptimal policy choices. 
This Part focuses on GASB’s arguments since GASB is by far the most 
prominent defender of its standards, and, to our knowledge, the only one to 
have mounted a principled defense.  Other detractors of accrual accounting 
for public entities point to the implementation costs such as training 
personnel, which seems trivial relative to the massive fiscal consequences 
exposited above.187  Governments around the world have increasingly adopted 
accrual accounting in recent decades, suggesting acceptance of the superiority 
of accrual accounting.188 
A. Longevity 
Arguably the most important distinction emphasized by GASB is 
longevity.189  Unlike private companies, governments will not go out of 
business.190  The GASB employs this distinction to assert that governmental 
 
186. Compare the minority statement:  
These minority members believe that the near-term measurement focus as 
proposed would further undermine the objective of providing information to 
assess interperiod equity by its requirements relating to short-term borrowings, 
such as tax anticipation notes (TANs).  Currently, short-term borrowings are 
accounted for as liabilities when the borrowed funds are received and as 
reductions in liabilities when they are repaid.  Per the proposed measurement 
focus, however, they would be reported as inflows of resources, rather than 
liabilities, when the borrowed funds are received and as outflows of resources, 
rather than reductions of liabilities, when the borrowed funds are repaid.  In 
other words, they would be accounted for similarly to taxes and other revenues 
when the borrowed cash is received and as operating costs when it is repaid.  
The government would thereby give the misleading impression that it has 
improved its economic position by incurring obligations intended to cover 
near-term cash shortages and worsened its economic position when it 
liquidates those obligations.   
GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., supra note 35, at 23.  
187. Andy Wynne, Is the Move to Accrual Based Accounting a Real Priority for Public Sector 
Accounting?, ACCA, Jan. 2004, at 9–10. 
188. PWC, TOWARDS A NEW ERA IN GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING AND REPORTING 
(2013), available at http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/psrc/publications/government-accounting-
and-reporting-pwc-global-ipsas-survey.jhtml. 
189. GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., supra note 34, at 5. 
190. Id. 
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accounting must focus more on the allocation of resources over the long term.191  
This includes, in particular, intergenerational equity—the requirement that 
current generations do not offload costs onto future generations.192 
The premise that governments should have a longer-term perspective is 
the most compelling argument for pure accrual accounting, rather than an 
argument for the current GASB approach.  The accounting prescribed by 
FASB for private businesses relies on a going concern assumption, which 
requires that all transactions be recorded based on the assumption that the 
accounting entity will be in operation indefinitely.193  As a result, every set of 
audited financial statements has a going concern opinion, in which the 
auditors specifically identify the entity and state whether that entity is 
expected to continue operating indefinitely.194  Without a positive going 
concern opinion, the financial statements must be adjusted to reflect the true 
economic condition of the company.195  GASB also has a going concern 
opinion.196  But GASB only requires that financial statement preparers 
evaluate whether there is substantial doubt about the government’s ability to 
continue as a going concern for twelve months beyond the financial statement 
date.197  As a result, a going concern opinion that doubts the ability of a 
government to continue operation is rare.  Even Detroit did not receive an 
unfavorable going concern opinion for the financial statements issued before 
its bankruptcy filing.198 
Reflecting the long-run situation of the entity rather than its short-term 
cash position is precisely the goal of accrual accounting.199  If public entities 
have a long-term perspective, then accrual accounting should be utilized.  
The current rules reward accounting gimmicks that boost short-term cash 
 
191. Id. 
192. Id. at 18. 
193. FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., supra note 67.  
194. REVSINE ET AL., supra note 18. 
195. For example, during the financial crisis, Ford did not receive a positive going concern opinion 
as the auditors could not certify that the business was not at substantial risk of liquidation.  As 
a result, the company had to make adjustments to its deferred tax position so that future tax 
benefits could no longer be recognized on the financial statements.  These adjustments were 
reversed one year later when Ford’s financial outlook had improved. 
196. RUPPEL, supra note 16, at 432. 
197. GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENTS OF GOVERNMENTAL 
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 56: CODIFICATION OF ACCOUNTING AND FINANCIAL 
REPORTING GUIDANCE CONTAINED IN THE AICPA STATEMENTS OF AUDITING 
STANDARDS 6 (2009). 
198. See CITY OF DETROIT, MICH., COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT (2012) 
(making no mention of an unfavorable going concern). 
199. REVSINE ET AL., supra note 18. 
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income at the expense of decreased future revenues or increased future 
liabilities.200  Intergenerational equity would be better served by true accrual 
accounting, which would prevent public entities from deriving short-term 
benefits at the expense of future generations. 
In addition, even though governments are long-lived, politicians do not 
have similar longevity.  A politician with a short horizon—like a governor in 
his second and final term—would have little incentive to defer revenues into 
later periods when he will not be in office.  Rather, he will have every 
incentive to maximize current revenues so that he can ensure that the 
initiatives he cares for are funded during his tenure.  To the extent that 
politicians have shorter horizons than corporate executives, there is an even 
stronger case for having accrual accounting in the public sector. 
Moving from high-level principles to practical applications, GASB 
draws on the longevity argument to justify a different approach to valuing 
certain assets, such as financial assets held in state pension funds.  According 
to GASB, “[t]he longer term view of operations of government is consistent 
with focusing on trends in operations, rather than on short-term fluctuations, 
such as in the fair values of certain assets and liabilities.”201  This approach 
would indeed be sensible if “trends” in asset prices could be identified ex ante, 
such that short-term fluctuations could be recognized and disregarded for 
accounting purposes.  Decades of financial research have conclusively 
demonstrated, however, that it is generally not possible to extrapolate future 
trends in asset prices from past performance.202  Asset prices fluctuate in the 
short term because the long term is uncertain.  In efficient financial markets, 
the current asset price is the best predictor of the risk adjusted future price.  If 
it were not, smart investors would either flock to or flee from the asset.  
GASB should follow FASB rules and report assets using a fair value approach 
not because the short term matters in itself, but because the current price is 
the best predictor of long term developments.203 
A direct consequence of the GASB’s position on pension asset values is 
that public entities can pretend not to bear the risk of their portfolio choices.  
Risker portfolios generally produce a higher expected return but do so by 
 
200. See Michael Granof, Stupid Budget Tricks, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2008/08/09/opinion/09granof.html?pagewanted=print. 
201. GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., supra note 34, at 8. 
202. See, e.g., Eugene F. Fama, Random Walks in Stock Market Prices, 51 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 75, 77 (1995); 
Jeff Stibel, Why We Can’t Predict Financial Markets, HARV. BUS. REV. BLOG (Jan. 22, 2009), 
http://blogs.hbr.org/2009/01/why-we-cant-predict-financial. 
203. BODIE ET AL., supra note 157. 
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increasing the probability that returns are negative.204  For example, an investment 
in the S&P500 Index can be expected to earn 8 percent a year.205   However, 
the actual return over the past five years has ranged from -37 percent to +26 
percent.206  The GASB’s position allows public entities to benefit from the higher 
expected return assumption, by reducing reported obligations, while allowing 
states to defer shortfalls that occur when investment returns do not meet 
expectations.207  Delaying loss recognition is a risky gamble.  Prudent long-term 
oriented accounting would record the current asset value, which is the best 
estimate of the long-term asset value. 
B. Organizational Purpose and Stakeholders 
The GASB emphasizes that public entities have a broader mission, and 
concomitantly more and different stakeholders, than businesses.208  While 
businesses focus on wealth creation for their investors, governments must 
provide various important services for its citizens with little or no regard to 
financial returns.209  Moreover, unlike shareholders who can sell, citizens 
must move away to exit their government.210  Accordingly, “[a] government’s 
financial reports should give creditors, legislative and oversight officials, 
citizens, and other stakeholders the information necessary to make 
assessments and decisions relevant to their interests in the government’s 
accomplishment of its objectives.”211  By contrast, “[h]istorically, the primary 
 
204. Id. 
205. John Linder & Neil Rue, Developing Expected Return and Risk Assumptions, PENSION CONSULTING 
ALLIANCE (Mar. 2012), http://www.pensionconsulting.com/Portals/0/UserReports/2012%20 
PCA%20Asset%20Class%20Assumptions%20Report%201.pdf. 
206. S&P 500, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/S%26P_500 (last visited Nov. 21, 2014). 
207. For example, in 2009 the California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS) pension 
plan reported that the asset value used to determine pension costs (the “actuarial value of assets”) was 
more than $8 billion less than the market value due to investment losses that were not required to be 
recognized under GASB.  CALPERS, STATE & SCHOOLS ACTUARIAL VALUATION AS OF 
JUNE 30, 2009 (2009), available at https://www.calpers.ca.gov/eip-docs/about/pubs/employer/ 
2009-st-body.pdf.  The actuarial valuation report notes: “We are monitoring the funded status of the 
State plans and Schools pool using the market value of assets since this is a better measure of the 
plans’ ability to pay benefits.”  Id. at 9. 
208. GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., supra note 34, at 8. 
209. Id. at 3–4; see also Wynne, supra note 187, at 9–11. 
210. GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., supra note 34, at 6. 
211. Id. at 4; cf. id. at 7 (“For governments, information necessary to make political and social decisions is 
as important in shaping accounting and financial reporting objectives as information necessary to 
make economic decisions.  Reflecting the needs of the stakeholders of business enterprises, including 
equity investors, financial reporting of business enterprises predominantly focuses on financial 
performance—earnings and its components.  For business enterprises, information for making 
economic decisions is most important in shaping accounting and financial reporting objectives.”). 
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focus of [business] reporting has been on earnings and its components, with 
little explicit focus on nonfinancial measures of performance.”212 
The essence of the GASB’s position is a non sequitur. It may be true 
that governments have more stakeholders.213  If so, governments may need to 
have additional, non-financial disclosures, provided suitable measures exist.  
By contrast, the existence of more stakeholders would not be an argument for 
different disclosures to the stakeholders that governments and private entities 
share, which is investors.  Genuine financial reporting should thus be 
unaffected by this difference between governments and businesses. 
In fact, the presence of other stakeholders makes financial reporting 
more important, not less.  The importance of financial information is vital for 
creditors, which governments have just like businesses.  Creditors use financial 
statements to assess the likelihood that their debt will be repaid.  Additionally, 
financial information is just as important for other stakeholders.214  Financial 
performance is an important aspect of overall performance.215  It is impossible to 
assess the quality of governmental management of public services without 
considering their costs.  For example, to understand the long run sustainability of 
current government services, including pensions, citizens must know their 
true cost.216 
Finally, the difference between “for profit” businesses and governments 
with respect to their financial objectives is overstated.  While governments do 
not have shareholders who would receive profits as cash payouts—also known 
as dividends—financially well-run governments can decrease taxes.  A decrease in 
taxes is the functional equivalent to a dividend payout from a citizen’s 
financial point of view.  For example, imagine a citizen who owns one share 
of a for-profit business and also pays property taxes to her local government.  
If the business improves its performance such that it can pay an additional 
dollar in dividends, the citizen is one dollar richer.  Equivalently, if the 
government improves its performance such that it can reduce taxes by one 
dollar, the citizen is also one dollar richer.  As far as finances are concerned, 
an extra dollar earned or saved by the government and passed on through tax 
reductions is as useful as an extra dollar earned or saved by the business and 
passed on through dividends. 
 
212. Id. at 4. 
213. We do not here take a position on whether a business corporation exists only for the benefit 
of shareholders or of other stakeholders as well. 
214. REVSINE ET AL., supra note 18. 
215. RUPPEL, supra note 16, at vii. 
216. This attribute is evident in the current scrutiny placed on public sector pensions, whose costs 
will ultimately be borne by future generations. 
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C. Sources of Revenue 
GASB next draws attention to differences in the source of revenue.  
Unlike businesses, governments finance themselves primarily through tax 
revenue.217  This is a one-sided transaction as opposed to an exchange, as in a 
sale of goods.218  This difference is important from a technical accounting 
perspective.  But differences in revenue sources cannot credibly be used to 
suggest that accrual accounting will not work for public entities.  Under 
FASB, there are numerous sources of revenue besides the sale or exchange of 
goods and services, and there are also rules to handle one-time asset sales and 
non-exchange transactions, such as gifts.219  Indeed, the recognition of taxes 
in the period for which they are levied, which is cited by GASB as an example 
of government accounting differences, mirrors several elements of the 
revenue recognition rules for non-exchange transactions under FASB.220  
While tax financing may require technical adaptations since business 
accounting rules do not consider tax revenue, it does not require deviations 
from the principles of accrual accounting. 
D. Role of the Budget 
Finally, GASB emphasizes the importance of the budget.221  The publicly 
disclosed and debated budget is an important tool of accountability for 
governments.222  Conversely, budgets of businesses are generally not disclosed 
to outside investors or other stakeholders.223  Governmental financial statements 
must provide sound information for budget planning and for assessing 
whether actual spending complied with the budgetary provisions.224  For this 
reason, governmental financial statements should be of high quality and 
represent the government’s financial position and performance as best as 
possible.  The best known method for presenting financial performance is accrual 
accounting.  To the extent that existing budget rules focus on cash measures, 
such measures must be reconciled to an accrual-based approach to provide 
transparency and accountability. 
 
217. RUPPEL, supra note 16, at 21. 
218. GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., supra note 34, at 4. 
219. REVSINE ET AL., supra note 18. 
220. Cf. id. at 4. 
221. GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., supra note 34, at 6. 
222. Id. 
223. Id. at 6. 
224. Id. at 21. 
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In fact, the current conflation of accrual and cash measures under modified 
accrual accounting undermines rather than supports sound budget policy.  For 
example, balanced budget requirements do not ensure the absence of long-term 
deficits if the budget is balanced only with respect to cash outflows and 
inflows in the current period.  Financial reporting should reveal this through a 
principled use of accrual measures.  By contrast, by utilizing unsuitable 
financial measurements, balanced budget requirements create merely the 
appearance of balanced budgets.  Balanced budget requirements have fooled 
even informed observers into believing that states are not running a deficit, 
despite the fact that states have amassed massive deficits in their pension 
plans and elsewhere.225 
IV. THE CASE FOR EMPOWERING THE SEC TO INTERVENE 
The GASB’s rules and principles should be changed to address the 
issues we identified in Part II.  There is good empirical evidence to suggest 
such improved reporting will not only clarify but, in the long run, ameliorate 
public sector finances.226 
Financial reporting is too complicated, however, for us to spell out all the 
details in this Article.  In fact, the complexity and updating needs of financial 
reporting rules are so great that their development and maintenance has been 
entrusted to specialized bodies all over the world.227  Accordingly, our focus 
here is on highlighting institutional reform that we hope will ultimately lead 
to better accounting standards for public entities.  Concretely, we support the 
SEC’s request to Congress for lifting some of the exemptions that currently 
prevent the SEC from applying the same beneficial influence it exerts on 
private accounting (FASB) to public accounting (GASB). 
We will begin this Part by stating the case for SEC intervention in the 
GASB.  Subpart IV.B discusses the SEC’s current lack of authority to intervene 
 
225. Cf. David A. Super, Federal-State Budgetary Interactions, in FISCAL CHALLENGES: AN 
INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH TO BUDGET POLICY 366, 371 (Elizabeth Garrett et al. 
eds., 2008) (asserting that “[s]tate requirements for annual balance mute concerns about 
intergenerational equity”). 
226. See discussion infra Parts I.C and II.B.2. 
227. See, e.g., IAS/IFRS Standards and Interpretations, EUROPEAN COMM’N (Mar. 10, 2014), 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/accounting/ias/index_en.htm; Comm. Statement of 
Policy Reaffirming the Status of the FASB as a Designated Private-Sector Standard Setter, 
Securities Act Release No. 8221, Exchange Act Release No. 47,743, Investment Company Act 
Release No. 26,028, 80 SEC Docket 139 (Apr. 25, 2003), available at https://www.sec. 
gov/rules/policy/33-8221.htm (reaffirming FASB and its Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAP) as the required accounting standards for registered issuers). 
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and implement such rules and regulations.  As we explain in Subpart IV.C, 
however, this lack of authority is an anomaly, in that the basic philosophy of 
securities laws would cover the protection of investors in municipal securities 
and private issuers equally well.  Subpart IV.D explains that there are no 
constitutional hurdles specifically with respect to the states, nor are there other 
concerns about legitimacy of federal action.  Therefore, we support the SEC’s 
request for regulatory authority from Congress. 
This Article proposes a reform of only municipal financial reporting 
and, more specifically, of the institutions that develop the rules and principles 
for such reporting.  We do not advocate a reform of the budget rules.  This would 
require action by states, as budget rules are contained in state laws and 
constitutions.228  Moreover, such change would be complicated since budget 
numbers are more than mere information for politicians and citizens.  Various 
other budget rules, in particular balanced budget requirements, reference 
budget numbers.  Changing these numbers would thus have effects beyond 
disclosure, and some of those effects might not be desirable. 
A. Need for Regulatory Intervention 
In principle, GASB could reform by itself.  Moreover, states and 
municipalities are free to produce better reports on their own volition, as 
GASB compliance is not mandatory.229  Unilateral action by individual states 
is unlikely, however.230  After all, politicians in power benefit from the current 
system’s ability to hide the true costs of their actions and delay painful 
measures until their successors are elected.231  In theory, politicians’ desire to 
reveal the true cost of their predecessors’ reign might counterbalance their 
 
228. See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 6. 
229. Cf. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N STAFF WHITE PAPER TO CONGRESS, Disclosure and 
Accounting Practices in the Municipal Securities Market, at 7–8 (July 26, 2007) [hereinafter Staff 
White Paper], available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-148wp.pdf (discussing 
how states use non-GASB methods). 
230. Stiglitz highlights the tension underlying a government’s incentives to be transparent, 
arguing that “[d]emocratic societies have a strong presumption in favor of transparency and 
openness in government.  But there has also long been recognition that on their own, 
governments and their leaders do not have the incentives to disclose, let alone disseminate, 
information that is contrary to their interests.”  Joseph Stiglitz, Transparency in Government in 
THE RIGHT TO TELL: THE ROLE OF MASS MEDIA IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 27, 
29 (2002). 
231. Ian Ball & Gary Pflugrath, Government Accounting: Making Enron Look Good, 13 WORLD 
ECONS. J. 1, 1 (Jan.–Mar. 2012);  cf. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 229, at n.33 
(showing that states even deviate from the already loose GASB rules to avoid recognizing 
future costs). 
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own benefits from obfuscation.  A look around the world suggests, however, 
that this counterweight is not sufficient in practice.  Some newly elected 
governments have restated their predecessors’ accounts to heave blame on 
them, most famously in Greece in 2004.232  As the example of alternating 
French governments restating their respective predecessor’s accounts 
demonstrates, however, such restatements are hardly a panacea.233  The 
French example illustrates the simple truth that if accounting rules are bad, 
accounting numbers are not reliable. 
Since the GASB has not reformed or implemented the sort of rules we 
advocate, SEC intervention is necessary.234  To explain the lack of reform 
some have speculated that the GASB has been captured by state governments 
through personnel and other influence.235  Alternatively, the GASB might be 
independent but hesitant to act because it understands that states’ compliance 
with GASB rules is not legally mandatory and might break down if it 
becomes too politically costly.236  In either case, the SEC should intervene 
and work with the GASB to move to a pure accrual system for issuers of 
municipal debt, and require compliance with these rules from municipal 
issuers.  States and municipalities would remain free not to comply with these 
rules, but only if they were to withdraw from the bond market.  We suspect 
that few states would do so.237 
B. Current Lack of Statutory Basis 
At present, the SEC has no leverage over municipal accounting, even 
through the bond market.  Municipal bonds are exempted securities under 
 
232. See Vincent Koen & Paul van den Noord, Fiscal Gimmickry in Europe: One-Off Measures and 
Creative Accounting 6 n.2 (Econs. Dep’t Working Papers, No. 417, 2005). 
233. Cf. id. (mentioning that new French governments audited their predecessors in 1997 and 2002 and 
that the 1997 government was a left government succeeding the right, and inversely in 2002). 
234. In its Preliminary Views report, which is expected to lead to an updated Statement of Governmental 
Accounting Concepts, the Board recommends that “the existing method of preparing financial 
statements using the current financial resources measurement focus should be replaced with the 
near-term financial resources measurement focus, which recognizes balances from a near-term 
perspective and flows of financial resources for the reporting period.”  GOVERNMENTAL 
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., supra note 35, at 5.  
235. E.g., Arthur Levitt, Jr., Standards Deviation, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 9, 2007), http://online.wsj.com/ 
news/articles/SB117341014938031922. 
236. It is also possible that GASB is a victim of insufficient institutional support.  The FASB has 
an annual budget of $39 million compared with $8 million for the GASB.  Similarly, the 
seven-member board of the FASB is employed full-time, whereas the seven-member GASB 
board is only employed part-time. 
237. Currently, all of them borrow on the bond market.  See MUN. SEC. RULEMAKING BD., 2013 
FACT BOOK 77 tbl. (2014) (showing every state as having trades on the municipal market). 
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the securities laws.238  As such, they are not subject to most of the rules of the 
securities acts.239  In particular, they are not subject to the registration and 
reporting requirements of the acts and the SEC’s authority to prescribe the 
form of financial reporting.240 
A more aggressive reading of the securities acts might find authority for 
the SEC to intervene in section 15 of the Exchange Act.241  It addresses fraud 
by dealers and is the statutory basis of Rule 15c2-12.242  Rule 15c2-12 
prohibits underwriters from underwriting municipal bond issues unless they 
have received a commitment from the issuer to provide regular financial 
information to the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board.243  By targeting 
the dealers and post-issue disclosure, the SEC was able to circumvent section 
15B(d)(1) of the Exchange Act.244  This so-called “Tower Amendment” 
merely prohibits the SEC from requiring an issuer “directly or indirectly 
through a purchaser . . . of securities from the issuer, to file with the Commission 
or the Board prior to the sale of such securities by the issuer any . . . document in 
connection with the . . . sale.”245  To improve the content of the financial information 
provided, the Commission could now argue that financial statements not based 
on high-quality accrual accounting are “deceptive.”246 
The SEC’s official position, however, is that “the Commission generally 
lacks authority to prescribe the accounting standards that municipal issuers 
must use.”247  In its 2012 report on the municipal bond market, the SEC 
called for additional statutory authority to demand financial statements and 
prescribe their form or to regulate those who would prescribe their form.248  
We thus turn to the possibility of an intervention by Congress. 
 
238. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c(12)(A)(ii)–(B)(ii), (15), (17)(A) (2012); 
Securities Exchange Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b (2012). 
239. ROBERT R. AMDURSKY & CLAYTON P. GILLETTE, MUNICIPAL DEBT FINANCE LAW: 
THEORY AND PRACTICE §§ 6.3.1, 6.4 (1992). 
240. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c (12)(a), (13)(a) (2012). 
241. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78o (2012). 
242. See Municipal Securities Disclosure, Exchange Act Release No. 34-33742, 56 SEC Docket 5 
(Mar. 17, 1994).   
243. See 17 C.F.R. §240.15c2-12(a), (b)(5)(i)(A). 
244. Cf. AMDURSKY & GILLETTE, supra note 239, at 378 (commenting that “the Rule seems to achieve 
indirectly what the Tower Amendment appears to preclude the SEC from doing directly”). 
245. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(d)(1) (2012) (emphasis added). 
246. Cf. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(2)(B), (D) (2012) (prohibiting certain “fraudulent, deceptive, or 
manipulative” behavior and granting the SEC authority to craft measures “reasonably 
designed to prevent” such behavior). 
247. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 38, at 71. 
248. Id. at viii. 
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C. Legitimacy of Congressional Intervention on Behalf of Investors 
Congress should intervene in the name of investor protection.  It is 
anomalous that the securities laws do not currently cover the municipal debt 
market with equal intensity as the private debt market.  Congress need not 
invoke benefits to state and municipal politics to justify intervention. 
The municipal bond market is of considerable size.  It is one quarter of 
the size of the private bond market, with $3.7 trillion in outstanding principal 
in 2012.249  In the past, the municipal market was simpler for investors than 
the corporate market, as most municipal bonds were insured against default 
by credit insurers.250  Since the financial crisis, however, these insurers have 
largely withdrawn from the market.251  Today most municipal bonds are 
uninsured and therefore subject to default risk.252  Given the size of the 
municipal market and its complexity, it is hard to see why investors would not 
need similar high quality disclosure for municipal bonds as they receive for 
corporate bonds.253  Indeed, the SEC has already become more stringent in its 
prosecution of fraud to protect investors in municipal bonds.  It has brought 
various enforcement actions against states and cities that mislead investors 
and, in many cases, later defaulted.254 
One might argue that mandatory disclosure by large issuers is 
unnecessary.  Disclosure will either be triggered by market pressure, so the 
argument would go, or it must be irrelevant (perhaps because investors can 
easily gather the information from other sources).255  This argument is in 
tension with the rationale of the securities laws, however, as it would also 
obviate the need for mandatory private issuer disclosure.256   Moreover, there 
is good reason to doubt the analytical validity of the argument.  Disclosure by 
multiple issuers creates network externalities, such that individual issuers and 
 
249. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 242, at 5. 
250. See Ely, supra note 40, at 109. 
251. See id. at 108. 
252. Id. 
253. Cf. Letter from Mary Colby, Industry Practices & Procedures Chair, NFMA, to Elisse B. Walter, 
Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Oct. 6, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/ 4-
610/4610-9.pdf. 
254. Steve Malanga, The Many Ways That Cities Cook Their Bond Books, WALL ST. J., June 1, 
2013, at A11. 
255. Cf., e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 286–90 (1991) (discussing how mandatory disclosure 
may be irrelevant because even in its absence market pressures would force firms to provide, 
and incentivize market participants to gather, information). 
256. Cf., e.g., id. at 296 (noting that mandatory disclosure must be predicated on a failure of the 
aforementioned mechanisms for information provision).  
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investors might not be able to obtain optimal disclosure by themselves.257  As 
reported in Part I.C, empirical research has documented that valuations and 
market quality improved after tightening of corporate disclosure requirements.258 
D. Constitutionality 
Congress has the constitutional authority to extend the securities acts’ 
disclosure rules to municipal bond issuers.259  The Tenth Amendment reserves 
to the states powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution.  
The United States has the power to regulate the interstate securities market, 
however, including the interstate securities market in municipal bonds. 
In the closely related case of South Carolina v. Baker, the Supreme Court 
opined that Congress had authority to prohibit bearer bonds, whether issued 
by states or private issuers. 260  According to the Court, the Tenth Amendment 
might only be implicated if the federal legislation “commandeer[ed]” the 
states by “seek[ing] to control or influence the manner in which States 
regulate private parties.”261  This is not the case with respect to municipal 
issuer disclosure, at least when they are imposed as a condition for using national 
securities markets, rather than direct interference with state accounting.262  More 
importantly, increased disclosure would support state democratic processes.  
The information generated by increased disclosure would help voters and 
other politicians assess the fiscal impact of politicians’ actions. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, we readily admit that our proposal is a long shot.  We 
expect strong resistance by GASB and state politicians, and obtaining 
Congressional action is difficult.  Nevertheless, the size of the financial 
accounting problem warrants exploration of solutions, even those with a low 
likelihood of success.  Besides, our proposal for improved financial reporting 
 
257. Art Durnev & Claudine Mangen, Corporate Investments: Learning from Restatements, 47 J. 
ACCT. RES. 679 (June 2009). 
258. See Welch, supra note 43. 
259. See Amdursky & Gillette, supra note 239, at § 6.2. 
260. 485 U.S. 505 (1988). 
261. Id. at 514. 
262. See, e.g., AMDURSKY & GILLETTE, supra note 239, at § 6.2 (pointing out that the court in 
the later case of New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), distinguished regulations 
“imposed directly on states,” which might be problematic, from “regulations applied to states 
as well as others engaged in similar activities,” which are not, and that this distinction would 
remove federal securities regulation from Tenth Amendment scrutiny). 
620 62 UCLA L. REV. 572 (2015) 
invites less resistance than alternatives, such as reforms of state budget rules.  
We hope this Article has illustrated that improved reporting in itself is an 
important step toward fiscal recovery.  We hope that SEC oversight of 
accounting by municipal issuers will be high on the list of candidate reforms 
when the next bankruptcy of a state or major city prompts Congress to 
reexamine municipal finances. 
 
 
 
